The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession by Khan, Fazal
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 26 | Issue 1
2016
The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming
Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s
Impact on the Medical Profession
Fazal Khan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical
Profession, 26 Health Matrix 123 (2016)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol26/iss1/8
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016 
123 
-Articles- 
THE “UBERIZATION” OF 
HEALTHCARE: THE 
FORTHCOMING LEGAL STORM 
OVER MOBILE HEALTH 
TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON 
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION  
Fazal Khan†  
Contents 
I.  Introduction .............................................................................. 124 
II.  The Development of Mobile Health:  From Concept to 
Reality ................................................................................... 130 
A.  The Elusive Triple Aim in Medicine .............................................. 130 
B.  Early Attempts at Transforming Medicine With Information 
Technology ................................................................................. 131 
C.   Laying the Foundation for Mobile Health:  Electronic Records, 
Artificial Intelligence, Evidence Based Medicine, and Case Based 
Reasoning .................................................................................. 133 
1.  Electronic Health Records ............................................................. 133 
2.    Artificial Intelligence ................................................................... 134 
3.   Facilitating the Use of Evidence Based Medicine ......................... 136 
4.  Case-Based Reasoning ................................................................... 138 
D.  Mobile Health:  The Missing Link Between Information 
Technology and The Triple Aim? ................................................. 138 
1.   Healthcare?  There’s an App for That ......................................... 138 
III.  Legal Barriers to mobile health ........................................... 141 
A.   Federal Regulations of Mobile Health and Tort Liability ................. 141 
B.  What is Scope of Practice ............................................................. 144 
1.  State-Based Medical Licensing Laws: Historical Context .............. 144 
2.  State Scope of Practice Laws: Complex & Inconsistent................. 147 
3.  The Case of Telemedicine: Erecting Barriers to Out-of-State 
Doctors ......................................................................................... 151 
 
† Fazal Khan, M.D-J.D. Associate Professor, University of Georgia School 
of Law.  Thank you to Nathan Cortez, Glenn Cohen, Nicholas Terry, 
Frank Pasquale, Bo Rutledge, Barry Furrow, Larry Singer, Keith 
Robinson, participants at the Harvard-Radcliffe Seminar on Mobile 
Health Technology and Emory-UGA faculty workshop series for their 
valuable discussion and suggestions.  Special thanks to Dean Rebecca 
White for supporting the research behind this effort, and Erika Furlong 
for her invaluable research assistance. 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal Storm Over 
Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession  
124 
4.  Federal Antitrust Enforcement ...................................................... 152 
IV.  American Healthcare and the Case for Disruptive 
Innovation .............................................................................. 157 
A.  The Intertwined Problems of Healthcare Costs and Access ............... 157 
B.  Mobile Health as Disruptive Innovation .......................................... 159 
V.  Proposal: United we stand, divided we fall ........................... 163 
A.  Achieving Expanded Scope of Practice Without a Faustian 
Bargain ...................................................................................... 163 
B.  The Uberization of Healthcare ....................................................... 164 
1.  Your Current Profession?  There’s an App for That ..................... 164 
2.  The Endgame:  Providerless Medicine ........................................... 167 
3.  The Threat to Healthcare Security ................................................ 168 
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................ 171 
 
We don’t need and probably can’t afford doctors as the front 
line of defense anymore. . . That’s the problem, isn’t it?  
Doctors.  They take a decade or more to train, and then you 
still have to feed them.  Kind of like the Lippizaner dancing 
stallion.  A neat trick, but terribly expensive to maintain.  
Okay, more like postal workers.  It’s pretty neat that you can 
train people to sort mail, but email servers do it much quicker 
and cheaper. . . There aren’t 10 million nerdy-looking, khaki-
wearing Ph.D.s reading search requests at Google.  Instead 
search expertise is embedded in Google’s algorithms on servers 
in cool dry places.  That’s scale .  .  . Doctors, take note.  The 
Geeks are at the Gate.   
-Andy Kessler, Silicon Valley Hedge Fund Manager1 
I.  Introduction 
It was not a fair fight.  In 2013, Senator Ed Hernandez sponsored 
a bill in the California legislature that would allow nurse practitioners 
(NPs) to practice primary care medicine without the direct 
supervision of a physician.2 The rationale for such a bill was clear.  
Like most states, California has an acute healthcare access problem, 
with only 16 out of 58 counties having sufficient numbers of primary 
care doctors.3 With baby boomers entering retirement and Americans 
 
1. ANDY KESSLER, THE END OF MEDICINE: HOW SILICON VALLEY (AND 
NAKED MICE) WILL REBOOT YOUR DOCTOR 110-111 (2006).  
2. Melanie Mason, State Bill to Boost Use of Nurse Practitioners Goes 
Nowhere, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2013/sep/01/local/la-me-healthcare-20130902. 
3. Id. 
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living longer with chronic diseases, the mismatch between demand for 
primary care and the supply of doctors is projected to increase in 
magnitude.  Prior to his effort, influential organizations such as the 
Institute of Medicine and the National Governors Association had 
already outlined and endorsed the enactment of state laws that would 
ease “scope of practice” restrictions on non-physicians in order to 
improve access to healthcare.4 In support of his bill, Sen. Hernandez 
could cite several studies that empirically demonstrated that “primary 
care provided by NPs is of similar quality to that provided by 
physicians.”5 Additionally, patient surveys have consistently shown 
high levels of satisfaction with primary care medicine delivered by 
NPs, with a majority of patients preferring to see a NP on the same 
day versus waiting an additional day to see a physician.6  
Despite all of this independent validation for easing scope of 
practice restrictions on non-physicians, hardly anyone was surprised 
when Hernandez’s bill failed to even make it out of committee.7  In 
support of Hernandez’s bill, the California Association of Nurse 
Practitioners paid $55,000 to hire an outside lobbyist for half a year.   
On the opposing side, California Medical Association (CMA), 
representing the interests of the state’s doctors, deployed its army of 
in-house lobbyists and outside hired guns in Sacramento and gave 
millions in campaign contributions to key state lawmakers.  Further, 
the CMA ran a sophisticated campaign that leveraged Facebook and 
Twitter to spread unsubstantiated patient safety concerns about this 
bill that spread to constituents casually checking social media updates 
on their Apple and Android devices.8  This anecdote of an entrenched 
economic interest using restrictive licensing laws to shield itself from 
competition is not a new story.  However, I predict that very soon a 
wildcard will emerge to dramatically tilt the balance of power in these 
legislative battles—the mobile health industry.   
Mobile health constitutes the “use of mobile and wireless devices 
to improve health outcomes, healthcare services and health research.”9 
 
4. Catherine Dower et al., Is it Time to Restructure Health Professions 
Scope-Of-Practice Regulations to Remove Barriers to Care, 32 HEALTH 
AFF. 1971, 1971-72 (2013). 
5. Joanne Spetz et al., 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1977, 1982 (2013). 
6. Michael Dill et al., Survey Shows Consumers Open To A Greater Role 
For Physician Assistants And Nurse Practitioners, 32 HEALTH AFF. 
1135, 1135 (2013).  
7. See Mason, supra note 2.  
8. Id. 
9. See Definitions of Mobile Health, mHiMSS (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.himss.org/ResourceLibrary/GenResourceDetail.aspx?ItemN
umber=20221. 
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Even though mobile health has some ways to go before developing 
something akin to the mythical “Tricorder”10 from Star Trek, recent 
developments have been impressive and the ultimate potential of this 
new technology is tantalizing.11 Imagine the following: without 
requiring a costly clinic or hospital visit, a mobile device can enable a 
healthcare provider (e.g., the Veterans Hospital Administration (VA) 
or Kaiser Permanente) to remotely diagnose a patient’s condition and 
recommend a medically appropriate treatment plan, which might 
include the inexpensive and medically appropriate option of remote 
monitoring and follow up.12 Furthermore, if a mobile health evaluation 
indicates that a patient’s condition is serious enough to require 
professional attention, a health care plan could send out a “physician 
extender” (e.g., physician assistant, nurse practitioner, home health 
aide, etc.) to your home, workplace, or long-term care facility with 
portable diagnostic equipment and even a mobile pharmaceutical 
dispensary that wirelessly interfaces with your secure electronic 
medical records (EMR).   
The diagnostic and treatment abilities of physician extenders 
could be greatly amplified by mobile medical apps (MMAs) that rely 
on powerful artificial intelligence engines operating on cloud servers.  
Who needs to wait weeks or even months to see an expensive 
specialist when a physician extender backed up by an artificial 
intelligence engine like IBM’s Watson can give you an “expert” 
answer without the wait, and at a fraction of the cost?  In other 
words, this technology could legitimately expand the scope of practice 
for physician extenders without sacrificing safety or quality.  
However, even assuming that mobile health can technologically 
 
10. See Jacopo Prisco, Scanadu: The Medical Tricorder from Star Trek is 
Here, CNN (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/tech/mci-
scanadu-tricorder/. (Still, some companies claim they are not that far 
away.  Qualcomm has sponsored the Tricorder X Prize competition to 
spur development of a mobile device similar to the Tricorder.  Scanadu, 
one of ten finalists in the competition, might be the closest thing yet to 
the tricorder.  It is a tiny puck-shaped device that can measure heart 
rate, temperature, blood pressure, oxygen level, and a complete EKG 
reading just by placing the device on your forehead.) 
11. See Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution? 47 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1173 (2014).   
12. Testimony of Jonathan Spalter Before the Subcommittee on Health 
Committee on U.S. House of Representatives, Energy and Commerce 
Comm., (Mar. 20, 2013) (statement of Jonathan Spalter). See also 
Tracy Hampton, Recent Advances in Mobile Technology Benefit Global 
Health, Research, and Care, 307 JAMA 2013 (2012) (discussing mobile 
health’s potential to allow patients to monitor their health in real-time, 
to interact with doctors, and for developing countries’ abilities to surveil 
the spread of infectious disease). 
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deliver on its promise to deliver accessible, low cost, and high quality 
healthcare—which is by no means a given—restrictive medical 
licensing and scope of practice laws at the state level stand in the way 
of this digital transformation of medicine.     
As business innovation scholar Clayton Christensen has observed, 
“Many of the most powerful innovations that disrupted other 
industries did so by enabling a larger population of less-skilled people 
to do in a more convenient, less expensive setting things that 
historically could be performed only by expensive specialists in 
centralized, inconvenient locations.”13 This statement perfectly 
describes the potential of mobile health to dramatically transform the 
delivery of healthcare if this technology can be combined with the 
legislative efforts to relax restrictive state licensing and scope of 
practice laws so that non-physicians (i.e., “less-skilled people”) can 
provide care independent of physicians (i.e., “expensive specialists”) 
and outside of traditional clinics and hospitals (i.e., “centralized, 
inconvenient locations”). Thus, going forward, the CMA and other 
physician interest groups will likely find that nurse practitioners and 
other providers will have strong political and financial support to 
redraft licensing and scope of practice laws from information 
technology (IT) giants such as Apple, Google, Samsung, Facebook, 
and IBM.  Further, from the perspective of physician organizations, 
this looming legislative battle might not be a fair fight.  
In the near term, the mobile health industry can rhetorically 
frame the relaxing of overly restrictive licensing and scope of practice 
laws for physician extenders vis-à-vis doctors, as a long overdue 
rebalancing of medical authority that will empower both non-
physician medical providers and consumers of healthcare.  This could 
result in the creation of many decent paying middle class healthcare 
jobs.14  Further, the lower level of training required for these new 
positions (i.e., not four years of pre-med followed by medical school 
and residency) could dovetail with the Obama Administration’s 
recently announced initiative to provide free access to community 
college.15 More significantly, this strategy could potentially help our 
 
13. Clayton Christensen et al., Will Disruptive Innovations Cure Health 
Care? HARV. BUS. REV. 3 (2000) (emphasis added). 
14. See Dionne Searcy et al., As Market Evolves, Health Care Opens Path, 
Often for Women, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/business/economy/health-care-
opens-middle-class-path-taken-mainly-by-women.html?_r=0. 
15. Adam Rubenfire, Healthcare Could Gain from Obama’s Free 
Community College Bid, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/ article/20150109/NEWS/301099948 
(“A proposal floated by President Barack Obama to provide federal 
funds for community college students’ tuition could produce an influx of 
new students seeking jobs in radiologic technology, nursing and health 
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nation’s strained healthcare system come closer to achieving the 
elusive “triple aim,” a medical system that delivers high quality, 
accessible, and low cost healthcare.16   
Perhaps foreshadowing the future of mobile health, mobile taxi 
service app Uber has successfully lobbied many cities that relaxing 
municipal licensing barriers for taxi services is an equitable measure 
that redistributes power from the taxi license or “medallion” owners 
to the actual drivers.  Thus, by cutting out taxi medallion leasing and 
dispatch fees, Uber drivers can take home more money than they 
would driving for taxi companies.  Plus, consumers benefit from 
driving services that are less costly, more convenient, and reportedly 
of higher quality.17 The above narrative sounds like a clear “win-win” 
for both Uber drivers and consumers.  But that is not where this 
story ends. 
In a stunningly short amount of time, Uber has transformed from 
a plucky mobile app start-up with a handful of employees, to a multi-
billion dollar leviathan that recently hired David Plouffe, a former 
chief political strategist for President Obama, to be its senior vice 
president for strategy and policy.  The hiring of Plouffe is a “move 
that further signaled the grand aspirations of companies like Uber, 
which are challenging entrenched industries and running into 
resistance from some local governments.”18  More significantly, Uber 
has quietly announced that it is testing “driverless” cars as part of its 
long-term strategy.  Thus, empowering its drivers vis-à-vis taxi 
medallion owners seems to be a transitional means to an end.19  The 
ultimate end appears to be that once Uber perfects driverless 
technology, it can cast aside its “empowered” drivers and make even 
more money.  Likewise, if mobile health technology becomes advanced 
 
information technology, industry observers say. The funding could 
remove a major obstacle for those hoping to earn health-related degrees. 
‘The tuition right now is preventing many people from entering the 
profession, so this will alleviate some of the shortages that exist,’ said 
Gerard Anderson, director of the Center for Hospital Finance and 
Management at Johns Hopkins University.”)  
16. See Donald Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 
HEALTH AFF. 759 (2008).  
17. Mike Isaac, Uber Picks David Plouffe to Wage Regulatory Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/ 
technology/uber-picks-a-political-insider-to-wage-its-regulatory-
battles.html?_r=0. 
18. Id. 
19. See generally Ben Kepes, The Battle Looms—Uber Developing 
Driverless Cars, Google Looking at Ridesharing. FORBES, (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkepes/2015/02/02/the-battle-looms-
uber-developing-driverless-cars-google-looking-at-ridesharing/. 
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enough, even physician extenders will be viewed as being too costly or 
inefficient, transforming basic healthcare into a “providerless” service. 
In this article I argue that we should be cautiously ambivalent 
about the rise of mobile health and actively manage its integration 
into the practice of medicine.20 Independent of mobile health, there 
are solid arguments to reform restrictive scope of practice and 
licensing laws within healthcare, as the Supreme Court recently 
affirmed in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC.21  Further, in order to “bend the cost curve” while our nation’s 
elderly populations surges, we need technological advancements in 
healthcare efficiency that mobile health theoretically could deliver.  In 
addition, while the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has improved access 
to individual insurance, this does not necessarily translate into easier 
access to medical care, another challenge this technology can address.  
Moreover, using mobile health to eliminate preventable human errors 
and promote evidence-based decision-making would seem to increase 
the quality of healthcare.  In the abstract, these are all desirable ends 
that mobile health combined with the relaxing of licensure and scope 
of practice laws could achieve.  However, I argue that we cannot 
ignore the long-term implications of the mobile health industry 
potentially eliminating many upper and middle-income medical jobs, 
and that we need to negotiate a transition to digitally mediated 
healthcare that is safe and equitable. 
In Part II of this article, I will describe in more depth the 
historical development of mobile health and its realistic potential to 
transform the future of medical delivery.  Next, in Part III, I will 
analyze the legal barriers facing the implementation of the mobile 
health industry, primarily focusing on restrictive state licensing and 
scope of practice laws for medical providers.  In Part IV, I will argue 
that political economy concerns will shape the starkest challenges to 
the rise of mobile health, drawing parallels to the legal and political 
battles Uber is currently fighting against regulators.  Finally, in Part 
V, I argue that physician extender interest groups seeking to expand 
their scope of practice and professional influence should avoid making 
a Faustian bargain with the rising mobile health industry against 
physicians for their own long-term viability.  I propose instead that 
doctors and physician extenders should reach a “grand bargain” to 
reform restrictive scope of practice reforms on a nationwide basis and 
stand as a united front to extract concessions from the federal 
government to protect against mobile health corporations and related 
 
20. See Nathan Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health 
Technologies, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 372, 373 (2014). 
21. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) 
(slip op.) 
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financial interests22 from altering the regulatory landscape to bring 
about the “Uberization” of healthcare—that is, providerless medicine.   
II.  The Development of Mobile Health:  From 
Concept to Reality 
A.  The Elusive Triple Aim in Medicine 
The triple aim for any nation’s healthcare system consists of 
delivering medical care that is i) accessible, ii) high quality, and iii) 
low cost.23  The historical challenge for American policymakers has 
always been to find a way to achieve one aim without sacrificing the 
other two.  For instance, the advent of managed care organizations 
(MCO’s) in the late 1980s seemingly reined in runaway costs, but 
patients perceived that this was done at the expense of quality.  This 
in turn led to a strong consumer and legal backlash against some 
MCO cost-control measures.24 More recently, opponents of the ACA 
have charged that increasing the accessibility of healthcare insurance 
will necessarily have a negative impact on overall healthcare costs and 
quality.25   
The growing demographic bump of elderly Americans (the “baby 
boomers,” ironically) poses a vexing challenge to our nation’s 
healthcare system.  Not only will there be more elderly patients, but 
they will live longer with chronic diseases that require ongoing 
medical care.  Exacerbating this problem, there is a large cohort of 
baby boomer physicians that have already retired or are in the 
process of retiring.  Even if medical schools dramatically expand their 
class sizes, they cannot come close to closing the projected primary 
 
22. Here’s another quote that summarizes Silicon Valley Hedge Fund 
Manager Andy Kessler’s vision for medical professionals: “You can smell 
it from this far away.  Doctors are toast. It’s the magic pill—heart 
attacks, stroke and cancer are cured [with scalable technology] .  .  . The 
stock market will help allocate capital to this business, rather than some 
socialist system of sphincter pricers at Medicare in Washington, D. C.  
Investors will swarm like killer bees .  . . Time to start another hedge 
fund?” KESSLER, supra note 1, at 322.    
23. See Berwick et al. supra note 16. 
24. See Petrovich v. Share, 719 N.E.2d 756, 775 (Ill. 1999). 
25. See Josh Kraushaar, Obama’s Legacy: A Health Care Law the Hurts His 
Party, NAT’L J. (May 2, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/obamas-legacy-
health-care-law-hurts-party-090143251.html (there are many other 
articles attacking the ACA or “Obamacare;” this one is representative of 
the notion that the ACA will have negative impacts on both the cost 
and quality of healthcare). 
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care shortfall of 90,000 doctors within the next five years.26  This 
perfect storm of increased demand for healthcare occurring at the 
same time of low physician supply seems to signal that something has 
to give in terms of cost, access, or quality. Or does it?  As discussed 
below, this seemingly intractable problem represents a huge window 
of opportunity for the mobile health industry.   
B.  Early Attempts at Transforming Medicine With Information 
Technology 
If our nation’s supply of healthcare is dependent upon medical 
experts that take years to train, then seemingly there is no short-term 
solution to our under-supply of physicians.  However, as medical 
informatics guru Peter Szolovits postulated over three decades ago:   
 
If the expertise of consultants can be captured in the form of 
computer programs which provide advice to less-expert 
physicians or other health-care providers, then any practitioner 
could call on that expertise whenever a patient’s case suggested 
the need for careful thought about some aspect of the illness or 
therapy … The opportunity is there to improve the health-care 
system by improving each physician’s ability to utilize the best 
ways of analyzing medical problems, as encoded in easily-
duplicated and updated computer programs.27 
 
Szolovits’ concept mirrors efforts in automation that other 
industries had long ago figured out—from textile manufacturing 
during the industrial revolution to widespread robotics use in car 
manufacturing beginning in the 1980s.  However, the American 
medical profession has always been an exceptional laggard in terms of 
automation and the integration of information technology within its 
workflow.  Historically, information technology only made inroads for 
administrative functions (patient records, billing, etc), but was hardly 
relied on for the core functions of medical care: diagnosis, treatment, 
and prevention.28   
The holy grail for pioneers in medical informatics was to create 
computing applications that can improve medical decision-making in 
 
26. See Amanda Swanson & Fazal Khan, The Legal Challenge of 
Incorporating Artificial Intelligence into Medical Practice, 6 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L 90, 114 (2012). 
27. Peter Szolovits, Preface, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN MEDICINE, xiii-xiv 
(Peter Szolovits, ed., 1982),  
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/medg/ftp/psz/AIM82/ch0.html#preface. 
28. See Swanson & Khan, supra note 26. 
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real world clinical settings.29 Their well-founded presumption was that 
medical errors often resulted from a physician’s lack of medical 
knowledge or inadequate analytical skills, and that computers running 
clinical decision support programs (“CDSPs”) could bridge this gap to 
improve patient safety.  In fact, the Institute of Medicine validated 
this presumption with its landmark 1999 report, “To Err is Human,” 
which estimated during its study period that between 44,000 and 
98,000 Americans die each year from preventable medical errors.30 
Yet, despite decades of exploration and countless millions spent on 
creating computer systems that could aid in medical diagnoses and 
treatment, the promise of AI and CDSPs remained unfulfilled.31  
The problem was that these early information technology 
applications did not fit well within the workflow of actual clinical 
practice.  Currently, we might take for granted voice activated 
commands on our electronic devices and easy to navigate graphical 
interfaces on computer programs that do not even require users to 
read an instruction manual—your grandparents do not need to be 
“computer literate” in order to use an iPad.  However, from the 1960s 
to the 1980s, computer literacy was a significant problem as one 
would actually have to know the proper commands to type in—
mistyped or wrong instructions would lead to frustrating “syntax 
error” messages.  In addition, early office computers were bulky and 
could not be brought to the patient’s bedside.32  Even with the advent 
of more user-friendly interfaces like Microsoft Windows in the 1990s, 
CDSPs were still a hard sell in the clinic.33  You still had to type 
information into a desktop computer, wait for your query to run, and 
then the CDSP would return a long list of medical probabilities to 
choose from, but no definitive diagnosis to choose from—this 
obviously represented a low value proposition.  Early personal data 
assistants (PDAs) like the Palm Pilot made some headway in the late 
1990s to early 2000s, but they were at most useful for storing 
information (e.g., a pharmaceutical reference guide) and hardly had 
 
29. Eta S. Berner et al., Will the Wave Finally Break? A Brief View of the 
Adoption of Electronic Medical Records in the United States, 12 J. AM. 
MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 3, 3 (2005). 
30. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999). 
31. See INST. OF MED., THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN 
ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR HEALTH CARE 45 (Richard S. Dick et al. 
eds., revised ed. 1997). 
32. See John B. Dewey et al., Acceptance of Direct Physician Access to a 
Computer-Based Patient Record in a Managed Care Setting, PROC. 
ANN. SYMP. ON COMPUTER APPLICATION MED. CARE 79, 79 (1994). 
33. Berner et al., supra note 29, at 4. 
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the processing power to run meaningful CDSPs.34 Ultimately, even as 
other industries and professions became more digitally automated, 
doctors opted to rely on their own knowledge and skill, dismissing 
these new technologies not only as ineffectual, but as an affront to 
their medical authority and autonomy to boot.   
C.   Laying the Foundation for Mobile Health:  
Electronic Records, Artificial Intelligence, Evidence Based Medicine, and 
Case Based Reasoning 
Humans make errors. We make errors of fact and errors of 
judgment. We have blind spots in our field of vision and gaps in our 
stream of attention. Sometimes we can’t even answer the simple 
questions. Where was I last week at this time? How long have I had 
this pain in my knee? How much money do I typically spend in a 
day? These weaknesses put us at a disadvantage. We make decisions 
with partial information. We are forced to steer by guesswork. We go 
with our gut.35  
1. Electronic Health Records 
The historical physician antipathy to computer automation 
contributed to the American healthcare system lagging woefully 
behind other industrialized countries in terms of integrating 
information technology with the practice of medicine.  In 2009, to 
address this deficit, President Obama signed the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”) 
to address this technological gap.36 This Act offered individual 
physicians and clinics generous financial incentives to encourage the 
adoption and use of health information technology (HIT), including 
specific incentives intended to accelerate the adoption of electronic 
health record (EHR) systems among providers.37  This represents a 
significant milestone for the mobile health industry, because mobile 
 
34. See generally Daniel C. Baumgart, Personal Digital Assistants in Health 
Care: Experienced Clinicians in the Palm of Your Hand?, 366 THE 
LANCET 1210 (2005). 
35. Gary Wolf, The Data-Driven Life, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/magazine/02self-measurement-
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
36. See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
37. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’ COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Health IT 
Adoption Programs, http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-
implementers/health-it-adoption-programs (Feb. 24, 2014).  
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medical apps (MMAs) are obviously useless in a world of paper-based 
patient records as they could not interface with them. 
2.   Artificial Intelligence  
Another unlikely milestone for mobile health occurred in 2011 on 
the television game show Jeopardy! as IBM’s Watson competed in a 
three-day contest against two former champions, Ken Jennings and 
Brad Rutter.38  Watson is an AI engine designed to engage in blazing 
fast data analysis and to provide useful answers to questions posed in 
natural language.39  Further, Watson can analyze data at the rate of 
about 200 million pages in three seconds, use voice recognition and 
complex algorithms to “make sense” of spoken queries, and can 
respond in natural language.40  Watson was not perfect, but it did 
crush its formidable human opponents, demonstrating that it could 
understand human vernacular, including the clever idioms used by 
Jeopardy!, and provide “expert” answers in real time. Obviously, the 
primary goal for IBM was to showcase the robustness of its new 
technology.  This strategy worked.   
In late 2011, IBM announced the first commercial application of 
Watson’s technology.  Significantly, it was in healthcare, as IBM 
teamed up with medical insurer Wellpoint.41 The potential 
applications for AI technology in healthcare are numerous and 
diverse.  Of particular interest, WellPoint stated that plans for 
Watson include suggesting treatment options and diagnoses for 
physicians, and assisting other healthcare practitioners to manage 
complex or chronic patient conditions.42  In other words, this is the 
realization of Szolovits’ earlier vision, using AI to augment the ability 
 
38. John Markoff, Computer Wins on Jeopardy!: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/ 
17jeopardy-watson.html?pagewanted=all.  
39. Chris Anderson, Wellpoint to Help IBM Bring Watson Technology to 
Market, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://healthcareitnews.com/ 
print/33932.  
40. Id. 
41. Anna Wilde Mathews, WellPoint’s New Hire. What Is Watson?, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424053111903532804576564600781798420.html. Additionally, 
early this year Watson began work for Citibank, Inc., analyzing 
customer needs and processing economic, financial, and client data to 
help personalize digital banking. Beth Jinks, IBM’s Watson Gets Wall 
Street Job After ‘Jeopardy’ Win, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2012), 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-05/ibm-s-watson-computer-gets-
wall-street-job-one-year-after-jeopardy-win.html. 
42. See Mathews, supra note 41. 
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of doctors and physician extenders. Consequently, Wellpoint envisions 
Watson, not an experienced doctor, guiding lesser-trained 
practitioners to the most likely diagnosis and treatment options for 
patients. If this strategy works according to plan, Wellpoint can 
increase both the efficacy and efficiency of healthcare delivered in its 
network.43 
AI has already proven its effectiveness in medical image analysis 
in the context of detecting early signs of cancer in x-rays,44 
mammograms,45 and computed tomography (CT) colonography.46 
Typically, a radiologist would first examine the images visually. Then, 
a computer-aided diagnosis (CAD) program would use algorithms to 
recognize and highlight areas of interest on these digital images for 
the radiologist, who can then determines whether the highlighted 
areas merit further examination.47  Essentially CAD is a pattern 
recognition and machine-learning tool that analyzes images for 
patterns that correlate with cancer or precursors to cancer.  
Although CAD is not good enough yet to independently diagnose 
lung, breast, or colon cancer,48 current CAD technology is robust 
enough to help radiologists spot cancers they might have otherwise 
missed.49 For instance, one FDA approved system for chest x-rays has 
demonstrated that it can detect up to 50 percent of the lung cancers 
that doctors missed in an initial x-ray reading.  This enables earlier 
treatment of a patient’s cancer, when it is much more effective.50  In 
dermatology, CAD has helped differentiate melanoma skin cancer 
from other pigmented skin lesions by analyzing digital images.  In 
fact, studies have shown that melanoma diagnosis by a computer is as 
 
43. Anderson, supra note 39. 
44. Riverrain Med., U.S. FDA Approves Improved Performance of 
OnGuard Chest X-Ray CAD Technology, MEDICEXCHANGE.COM, June 
24, 2010, PR NEWSWIRE (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-fda-approves-improved-
performance-of-riverain-medicals-onguard-chest-x-ray-computer-aided-
detection-technology-96787199.html [hereinafter OnGuard]. 
45. Jason Launders, Computer Aided Detection, BIOMEDICAL 
INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 126, 126 (2004). 
46. See Abraham H. Dachman et al., Effect of Computer-Aided Detection 
for CT Colonography in a Multireader, Multicase Trial, 256 RADIOLOGY 
827 (2010). 
47. Launders, supra note 45, at 126. 
48. Id. at 126 (finding only about 3% of marks identified by CAD on 
mammograms are found by the radiologist to require further 
examination).  
49. Dachman et al., supra note 46, at 828. 
50. OnGuard, supra note 44. 
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accurate as diagnosis by expert dermatologists with a dermatoscope 
under experimental conditions.51  When you consider how difficult it 
is for someone with basic insurance, let alone Medicaid, to schedule an 
appointment with a dermatologist or radiologist, one can see that if 
healthcare plans automated these expensive specialist services, they 
could increase access, lower costs, and yet also improve quality for 
cancer treatments through earlier detection.     
3.  Facilitating the Use of Evidence Based Medicine 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is the process of basing clinical 
decision-making on the best available objective and unbiased medical 
research.  This generally entails incorporating findings gained from 
randomized controlled clinical trials or systematic reviews of data 
from multiple trials.52 EBM involves four steps: (i) forming the clinical 
question; (ii) searching for the best evidence; (iii) evaluating this 
evidence for validity, impact, and applicability; and (iv) implementing 
this evidence into clinical practice.53  However, outside of academic 
centers, it is rare for practicing doctors to maintain their busy clinical 
duties while also remaining abreast of all the latest research findings.  
Thus, the Institute of Medicine, a part of the National Academy of 
Sciences, estimates that less than half of American medical practice is 
evidence-based.54  
One strategy to incorporate EBM in patient care is for medical 
organizations to promulgate evidence-based guidelines (EBG) to 
doctors and other providers.  EBGs provide specific criteria and 
thresholds for interventions based on published research. In theory, 
EBGs can standardize and improve patient care by making relevant 
medical evidence easily accessible in the clinical setting.  In other 
words, doctors do not need to constantly monitor the latest scientific 
publications in order to practice EBM, they can simply follow the 
EBGs.  However, in practice many doctors still do not follow EBGs  
because of time constraints, the lack of ready availability at all points 
of care, or the lack of clarity of EBGs for less-experienced 
 
51. Id. at 592. 
52. Benjamin William Sissons et al., Using Artificial Intelligence to Bring 
Evidence-Based Medicine a Step Closer to Making the Individual 
Difference, 32 MED. INFORMATICS & INTERNET MED. 11, 12 (2007). 
53. Joseph F. Sucher et al., Computerized Clinical Decision Support: A 
Technology to Implement and Validate Evidence Based Guidelines, 64 J. 
TRAUMA INJURY, INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 520, 521 (2008). 
54. LeighAnne Olsen et al., Workshop Summary, Learning What Works: 
Infrastructure Required for Comparative Effectiveness Research, INST. 
OF MED. 1, 97 (2011) 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Quality/VSRT/C
omparativeEffectivenessWhitePaperF.ashx. 
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physicians.55  The implication for patients is that their doctors might 
be delivering care that does not match up with the latest scientific 
evidence, which necessarily impacts quality and cost of care.  
Automated clinical decisions support programs (CDSPs) can 
alleviate this problem.  To assist with the implementation of EBGs, a 
CDSP can provide rule-based therapy guidance.56 The process begins 
with an algorithm that obtains patient data measurements. These 
measurements are then compared with thresholds for intervention. If 
the threshold is met, then the CDSP makes a brightline yes/no 
recommendation in real-time.  The information needed to generate the 
rules for these thresholds comes from EBGs and other medical 
research. The doctor can then decide if the proposed intervention is 
appropriate for his or her unique patient and can determine whether 
or not to follow the CDSP suggestions. Allscripts, a popular EHR 
system, has already integrated this technology into its system.57  
One critique of the EBM movement is that it reflects the best 
treatments for the “average patient,” which is based on aggregate 
population data. This does not necessarily represent how an 
individual patient will react to a specific treatment.58 However, newer 
CDSPs have the capability to assist in personalizing treatment 
guidelines for unique patients, ushering in a new era that combines 
the best of EBM and personalized medicine.59 The CDSP can propose 
additional or alternative interventions based on an analysis of how a 
particular patient responded to previous treatments.  To rely on a 
doctor to do this for each of her patients would obviously be cost-
prohibitive.  This type of rule-based therapy guidance programs for 
individual patients has already proven to be effective in a number of 
aspects of care, including blood transfusions, antibiotic therapy, 
trauma shock resuscitation, and glucose management using insulin.60  
Yet again, the important takeaway is that the advent of electronic 
 
55. See e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET 
THINGS RIGHT 196-197 (2010). 
56. See id. at 198. 
57. Allscripts incorporates the latest medical and clinical practice knowledge 
into its EHR systems through its Sunrise Clinical Manager module, 
which is embedded directly into the EHR’s screens, complementing 
healthcare professionals’ expertise and experience with the goal of 
improving the clinical decisionmaking of users. Partner Finder, 
ALLSCRIPTS (2015), http://www.allscripts.com/company/ 
partners/partner-finder.  
58. Sissons et al., supra note 52, at 12. 
59. Sucher et al., supra note 53, at 523. 
60. Id. at 524. 
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health records and the use of EBGs or rule-based guidelines enables 
and validates the further automation of healthcare delivery.   
4. Case-Based Reasoning 
The analytical process of case-based reasoning (CBR) presents 
another option for personalizing patient care.  CBR is a method of 
computer reasoning that entails solving new problems by analyzing 
solutions to similar past problems.  Another way to conceptualize this 
process is the “nearest neighbor” algorithm, which means searching 
through a database of old cases and finding those most similar to the 
present patient, which in turn can help predict a patient’s response to 
different treatment options and lead to the optimal course of care.61 
CBR decision support programs have already been deployed to assist 
in diagnosis and treatment of mental health disorders, cardiovascular 
disease, diabetes,62 and stress,63 among many other ailments. CBR 
programs could mine the data of local patients64 or even broader 
patient pools as national and regional health information exchanges 
come online.  CBR programs’ machine-learning capabilities enable the 
CDSP to apply rules learned from prior “nearest neighbor” analyses 
while also taking into account the newest data provided from patient 
records, thereby speeding up its “learning curve.”65  
D.  Mobile Health:  The Missing Link Between Information Technology 
and The Triple Aim? 
1. Healthcare?  There’s an App for That 
Already start-ups and established healthcare companies have 
developed numerous mobile medical applications (MMAs) that can 
transform smartphones or tablets into microscopes, stethoscopes, 
EKGs, dermatoscopes, and even mini-laboratories that can test bodily 
fluids.66 Some of these apps have proved to be remarkably sensitive, 
 
61. Id., at 533. 
62. Alec Holt et al., Medical Applications in Case-Based Reasoning, 20 
KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING REV. 289, 290 (2006). 
63. Shahina Begum et al., A Case-Based Decision Support System for 
Individual Stress Diagnosis Using Fuzzy Similarity Matching, 25 
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 180,180 (2009). 
64. Sissons et al., supra note 52, at 14. 
65. See id. at 15. 
66. See e.g., David Breslaueret al., Mobile Phone Based Clinical Microscopy 
for Global Health Applications, 4 PLoS ONE 3 (2009) (discussing the 
use of microscope apps to diagnose malaria and tuberculosis); MOBILE 
STETHOSCOPE, http://mobilestethoscope.com; ALIVECOR’S MOBILE ECG, 
http://www.alivecor.com; MOLE DETECTIVE 2, 
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reporting that non-experts were able to diagnose conditions within 
1.25 percent accuracy of experts.67 With “microscope” apps, 
researchers reported that they were able to capture reliable images of 
infected cells by developing a microscope attachment for camera-
enabled mobile phones. Where necessary, the images could then be 
sent wirelessly for analysis.68 The researchers noted that “the fact that 
mobile phones are essentially embedded computer systems offers the 
opportunity for significant post-processing of images,” which 
facilitated their diagnosis of the underlying diseases of malaria, TB 
and sickle cell anemia.69 In fact, as one expert noted, “[a] typical 
smartphone has more computing power than Apollo 11 did when it 
landed on the moon.”70  
There is tremendous hope that mobile health can succeed where 
other efforts to alleviate cost and access problems for healthcare 
system have failed, by empowering patients to manage their own care 
and augmenting the capabilities of medical providers.71 In concert 
with emerging clinical practices emphasizing integrated care, mobile 
health could facilitate monitoring of chronic diseases in real time, 
 
https://itunes.apple.com/ 
us/app/mole-detective-2/id504152136?mt=8. 
67. Tina Rosenberg, The Benefits of Mobile Health, on Hold, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2013),  http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/the-
benefits-of-mobile-health-on-hold/ (discussing a microscope attachment 
created by Aydogan Ozcan, out of an electrical engineering lab at 
UCLA, that can detect common diseases and allergens). But see Joel 
Wolf et al., Diagnostic Inaccuracy of Smartphone Applications for 
Melanomia Detection, 149 JAMA DERMATOLOGIST 422 (2013) (reporting 
that findings that apps purporting to diagnose skin cancer were not up 
to the task. In particular, those using algorithms to analyze images were 
the least sensitive, whereas those that sent images to board-certified 
dermatologists proved the most sensitive). 
68. Breslauer et al., supra note 66, at 2. 
69. Id.  
70. Statement of Robert Jarrin Senior Director, Government Affairs 
Qualcomm Incorporated: Hearing on “Health Information Technologies: 
Harnessing Wireless Innovation” Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications & Tech. (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/ 
IF16/20130319/100525/HHRG-113-IF16-Wstate-JarrinR-20130319-
U1.pdf. 
71. See, e.g., Joshua Brusten, Coming Next: Using an App as Prescribed, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012 www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/ 
technology/coming-next-doctors-prescribing-apps-to-patients.html?_r=1 
(describing how new doctor prescribed apps might be used to reduce the 
amount of care patients need by providing patients with diabetes, 
cardiology, arthritis, and physical management systems, for example). 
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which in turn could provide untold benefits for understanding the 
causes and progressions of these diseases.72  
For instance, patients or their sensors could input vital signs, 
which nurses or other computer programs could monitor on an 
ongoing basis. One example is an inexpensive mobile EKG adapter 
that heart patients could attach to their smartphone.  In the event of 
chest pain, the patient or family member could place the sensor on 
the patient’s skin, and EKG readings could be sent to caregivers in 
advance of the patient’s arrival at the hospital.73 Such savings in time 
treating coronary artery disease can have dramatic effects in patient 
outcome. The developers of AirStrip, a mobile health interoperability 
platform, reported that their technology was able to reduce time from 
chest pain to medical intervention (i.e., coronary catheterization) from 
45 minutes to just 15-20.74 For patients suffering from a heart attack, 
prompt treatment can increase their likelihood of survival and prevent 
permanent damage to heart tissue.75 Widespread availability of 
medical apps that record patients’ health data could also prove 
invaluable for researchers seeking to monitor the spread of disease, 
understand the root causes of illness, and identify subtle effects of 
environmental exposures on individuals.76   
Mobile health apps targeted for health professionals can also 
enable diagnostic and imaging support, access to patient medical 
 
72. See e.g., Jan van der Greef, Thomas Hankemeier & Robert McBurney, 
Metabolomics-based Systems Biology and Personalized Medicine: Moving 
Towards n=1 Clinical Trials? 7 PHARMACOGENOMICS 1087, 1090-1091 
(2006). 
73. Donna Fedor, , Proliferation of Consumer Platforms and Devices into 
the Medtech Ecosystem, Part II, MPO (2012), http://www.mpo-
mag.com/articles/2012/03/proliferation-of-consumer-platforms-and-
devices-in.  
74. Id. See also AIRSTRIP, http://www.airstriptech.com/airstrip-one.  
75. See e.g., Elizabeth Bradley et al., Strategies for Reducing the Door-to-
Balloon Time in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2308, 2308 (2006). 
76. See ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE: HOW THE 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION WILL CREATE BETTER HEALTH CARE vi, at 229-31 
(2012) (discussing the potential to harness sensor data from billions of 
patients to inform a Wikimedicine project. “Massive pooling of the 
granular but ‘pixelated’ data from individuals creates a positive 
feedback loop, such that the overabundant granular data becomes more 
valuable and defined - transforming the extensive data to real 
information and knowledge that can ultimately be used to improve the 
health of individuals.”) 
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records, monitoring programs, and even performance of diagnostic 
tests (e.g., EKGs and STD tests).77  
The inherent portability of mobile health applications is a key 
attribute that cannot be stressed enough. Combined with increasingly 
powerful CDSPs that can be tapped into from anywhere, the 
portability of mobile health means that powerful medical technologies 
can now be untethered from expensive infrastructures like hospitals 
and clinics.78  This same dynamic also means that eventually, medical 
expertise might be untethered from medical experts, posing an 
existential threat to the medical profession.79  However, in the near 
term, physician groups have a powerful defense to such encroachment 
upon their professional domain, restrictive licensing and scope of 
practice laws. 
III. Legal Barriers to mobile health 
Medicine is remarkably conservative to the point of being 
properly characterized as sclerotic, even ossified. Beyond the 
reluctance and resistance of physicians to change, the life 
science industry... and government regulatory agencies are in a 
near paralyzed state, unable to break out of a broken model of 
how their products are developed or commercially approved. 
We need a jailbreak. We live in a time of economic crisis 
because of the relentless and exponentially escalating costs of 
health care, but we’ve done virtually nothing to embrace or 
leverage the phenomenal progress of the digital era. That is 
about to change. Medicine is about to go through its biggest 
shakeup in history.80   
 
-Dr. Eric Topol  
A.   Federal Regulations of Mobile Health and Tort Liability 
Typically, heavily regulated products like medical devices, have 
high performance thresholds which are intended to be barriers to 
entry.81 Disruptive alternative technologies attempt to provide lower 
 
77. See Brian Edwards, AliveCor Receives FDA 510k Approval In Just 80 
Days, MOBILE HEALTH, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.imedicalapps.com/ 
2012/12/alivecor-fda-510k-approval/. 
78. See Brandon Keim, Paging Dr. Watson: Artificial Intelligence as a 
Prescription for Health Care, WIRED (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/10/watson-for-medicine/.  
79. Khan & Swanson, supra note 26. 
80. Supra note 76, at vi. 
81. CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA xviii (1997). 
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performance alternatives as a “response to performance oversupply.”82 
Thus, “[t]o the extent that the requirements established by regulation 
exceed the requirements of the average consumer, disruptive 
innovation cannot occur.”83 Often, regulatory agencies may be unable 
or unwilling to consider whether the outcomes they produce are 
desirable because they are designed to deal with a “narrowly defined 
question” and not to consider the “net impact of the rules on 
efficiency and quality in the marketplace.”84 In addition to statutory 
barriers in regulated industries, there is the potential for agency 
capture by the established industry, in this case the traditional 
medical device industry, which can result in policy decisions that 
make it more difficult for startup companies offering disruptive 
innovations.85  Taken together, all of this could mean that the federal 
regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will erect high barriers to 
entry for mobile health devices—but in reality, nothing could be 
further from the truth.  
The pharmaceutical and medical device industry often rail against 
the obstructionism of the federal government towards new medical 
technologies. 86 Further, some mobile health developers fretted about 
the lack of guidance from the FDA on the treatment of mobile 
medical apps (MMAs) and wondered whether this industry would face 
 
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 200. 
85. See John Abraham, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a Political Player, 
360 THE LANCET 1498, 1498 (2002). 
86. See Josh Makower et al., Medical Technology Innovation: A Survey of 
Over 200 Medical Technology Companies, EUCOMED 1, 6-8 (2010), 
http://eucomed.org/uploads/Press%20Releases/FDA%20impact%20on%
20U.S.%20Medical%20Technology%20Innovation.pdf (accessed May 9, 
2013). But see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDA HAS MET MOST 
PERFORMANCE GOALS BUT DEVICE REVIEWS ARE TAKING LONGER, 
(2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588970.pdf (contending that 
according to a recent - and contested by the FDA - survey, it took an 
average of fifty-four months for devices to obtain market approval. 
Bringing “a low-to-moderate-risk 510(k) product from concept to 
clearance was approximately $31 million with $24 million spent on FDA 
dependent and/or related activities. For a higher-risk PMA product, the 
average cost from concept to approval was approximately $94 million 
with $75 million spent on stages linked to the FDA.) For the FDA’s 
response, see Editors: FDA medical-device approval studies flawed, 
CENTER WATCH NEWS ONLINE (JULY 22, 2011), 
http://www.centerwatch.com/news-online/article/1967 
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onerous regulations before it got off the ground.87  However, in 
comparing the regulatory review process between the U.S. and E.U. 
for medical devices, another study refuted criticisms that the U.S. 
process is too “slow, risk-averse and expensive.”88  Rather, the authors 
concluded that rather than delays to market entry, the biggest 
problem facing the U.S. regulation of medical devices was the 
inappropriate use of the lower 510(k) review for high-risk devices.89  
When the FDA finally released its final rule on MMAs, it essentially 
read like an industry wish-list.  As one scholar succinctly noted, 
“Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, federal regulators are 
sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile health products.”90  
For example, general wellness apps (e.g., nutrition and exercise 
counters), which constitute the vast majority of current MMAs, will 
not be regulated as medical devices but instead will be subject to 
marketing and privacy regulations promulgated by the FTC.  Perhaps 
most tellingly, the FDA abstained from regulating consumer mobile 
device manufacturers directly (e.g., Apple, Samsung, Motorola, etc), 
even though the latest versions of their handsets have clearly been 
designed with sensors and features intended to take advantage of the 
growing mobile health market. 
The FDA will regulate MMAs that are used for diagnostic and 
treatment purposes as medical devices.  The level of regulation a 
medical device is subject to depends upon its risk classification: Class 
I (low risk), Class II (moderate risk), or Class III (high risk).  
Classification is determined by the device’s intended use and the risk 
it poses to the patient. Class III devices must get pre-market approval 
using clinical trials.  Class II devices only have to submit a 501(k) 
notice to the FDA, which the FDA normally approves in a short time 
frame.  For example, the mobile devices iGlucose and AliveCor, were 
 
87. See e.g., Alan Portela, My wish list: FDA mobile medical app 
regulation, mHiMSS, (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.mhimss.org/blog/my-
wish-list-fda-mobile-medical-app-regulation. CEO of mobile health care 
company, AirStrip, advocating for a breadth of FDA regulation which 
(perhaps ironically) actually underlies the problem FDA will face in 
delineating a well-reasoned scope for its regulation of emerging 
technology. For instance, Portela suggests that FDA will need to 
regulate the internet for content and operating systems and accessories 
for their reliability. 
88. See e.g., Daniel Kramer, Shuai Xu & Aaron Kesselheim, Regulation of 
Medical Devices in the United States and European Union, 366 NEW 
ENG. MED. J. 848, 848 (2012). 
89. Id. at 852. 
90. See Cortez, supra note 11. 
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able to obtain clearance within months of first filing their 510(k).91  
Lastly, Class I devices typically require no pre-market notification at 
all.92 
In other words, federal regulations that apply to the mobile health 
industry do not seem to be a significant barrier to this industry’s 
growth.  Similarly, as I addressed in a previous article, unsettled 
medical liability issues surrounding the use of mobile health devices 
are not intractable, as large healthcare organizations can afford take 
on the enterprise risk of any technology failures, and likely will push 
ahead with mobile health technology in order to realize its promised 
benefits.93  Thus, as I asserted above, the biggest legal barriers 
standing in the path of the putative mobile health revolution, are 
restrictive medical licensing and scope of practice laws at the state 
level.     
B.  What is Scope of Practice? 
1. State-Based Medical Licensing Laws: Historical Context 
One of the biggest impediments to achieving more uniform and 
flexible scope of practice laws is inertia. States engage in licensing and 
policing of scope of practice laws because that it how it has been done 
since colonial times. Regulation of medicine traditionally falls under 
the states’ police powers which permit regulation for general welfare.94  
This includes laws necessary to ensure effective sanitation measures, 
infectious disease control and regulation of professions, like law and 
medicine, that impact general welfare.95 After a physician 
demonstrates sufficient medical proficiency, through meeting 
educational requirements and passing the medical licensing 
examination, a state typically permits her to practice to the full scope 
of medicine, subject only to requirements that she exercise good 
 
91. See generally id. The app iglucose submits diabetic patients’ glucose 
readings to a portal that is accessible by health care providers. Its 
developer, Health ID, submitted a 510(k) in July 2011 and was cleared 
by November 2011. Brian Edwards, AliveCor receives FDA 510k 
approval in just 80 days, MHEALTH, (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.imedicalapps.com/2012/12/alivecor-fda-510k-approval/. 
92. See Cortez, supra note 11. 
93. See Khan & Swanson, supra note 26.  
94. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of 
Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for  Medical 
Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed 
Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 202-03 (1999).   
95. See id.  
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professional judgment and conform with industry standards.96  This is 
an extremely generous standard for doctors, meaning that you can 
find psychiatrists or OB/GYNs that can legally offer botox injections 
for wrinkles (i.e., do not need to be a dermatologist) or radiologists 
that start up “men’s health” clinics (i.e., do not need to be an 
endocrinologist).97 
Historically, regulation of medical professionals was very limited 
before the Civil War.98 
 
Prior to that time, physicians tended to be 
untrained and the medicine that they practiced tended not to work. 
As germ theory emerged and sanitation practices improved in the mid 
to late nineteenth century, treatments and diagnosis based on 
scientific research took hold with medical elites in charge of running 
hospitals and training the next generation of doctors, and less latitude 
granted to those who insisted upon engaging in ineffective traditional 
forms of medicine.99 Once these new practices were discovered, the 
need for formal training became more imperative as demand for the 
new techniques increased.  
Consequently, over a century ago, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) created the Council of Medical Education and 
began setting minimum standards for medical school curricula.100  The 
movement was brought on by the sense that many doctors were 
continuing to use traditional procedures that were “ineffective and 
dangerous” and simply ignored new scientific developments. Reform 
was spurred on by publication in 1910 of the landmark Flexner 
Report, a study funded by the Carnegie Foundation that was 
intended to evaluate medical school performance.101 The report 
 
96. See William P. Gunmar, The Scope of a Physician’s Medical Practice: 
Is the Public Adequately Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer 
Review, and the National Practitioner Data Bank? 14 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 329, 332 (2005). 
97. See Donald Jablonski, When Doctors Drift, Question of Competency 
and Ethics Are Key, NORTH CAROLINA MED. BD. (Aug. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.ncmedboard.org/resources-
information/professional-
resources/publications/forumnewsletter/article/when_doctors_drift_qu
estions_of_competency_and_ethics_are_key, 
98. Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical 
Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board 
Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care 
Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 206 (1999). 
99. WILLAM BYNUM, SCIENCE AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 218-222 (1994). 
100. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Changing Premed Requirements and the Medical 
Curriculum, 296 JAMA 1128, 1128 (2006). 
101. Id. 
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essentially “codified the need to systematically integrate [scientific 
advances such as new practices in bacteriology, anti-septic surgery 
and vaccinations] into the training of physicians.”102 While 
recommending the integration of science into medical education and 
training might not seem controversial, at the time many medical 
doctors were highly critical of the Flexner Report and its suggested 
reforms—these medical practitioners that had a lot to lose with the 
implementation of new standards. Nevertheless, in the early 1900s, 
the health care system was not as well organized into factions that 
could effectively oppose such a massive reform. Not until the 
profession took the report’s recommendations seriously did dangerous 
practices like “purging, bleeding, cathartics and proprietary 
medicines” lose favor.103
 
  
There is a seeming paradox that medical licensing is state-based 
when every other trend in America’s healthcare system has been to 
establish national standards.  In addition to medical school curricula, 
national licensing exams, residency training standards, tort liability 
standards, practice guidelines, and institutional accreditation 
standards are all nationalized.  For instance, during the 1960s and 
1970s courts began dismantling the “locality rule” for medical 
malpractice claims in favor of judicially imposing a national standard 
of care in delivering medicine.104  Further, many doctors also opt to 
become “board certified” by a national medical specialty organization, 
such as the American College of Surgeons. These boards have existed 
since the early part of the twentieth century and are intended to 
ensure that doctors are sufficiently competent to practice within their 
specialty.105  For institutions, the non-profit Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals (now known as “The Joint Commission”) 
has long set national standards that hospitals have to meet in order 
to qualify for Medicare reimbursements.106  
All of the above developments reinforce the policy argument that 
medical licensing standards should be uniform across state borders for 
clarity and to reduce fragmentation in an overly complicated 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
283, 284 (2004). 
105. Troyen A. Brennan et al., The Role of Physician Specialty Board 
Certification Status in the Quality Movement, 292 JAMA 1038, 1040 
(2004). 
106. The Joint Commission History, THE JOINT COMMISSION, 
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/ 
1/6/Joint_Commission_History_2012.pdf 
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system.107  Yet, state medical boards have jealously guarded their 
regulatory authority by renouncing even piecemeal efforts to achieve 
greater uniformity in targeted ways.108 Furthermore, because medical 
licensing legitimately falls within the states’ police powers, states can 
assert a federalism defense to any encroachment upon their licensing 
powers.  
2. State Scope of Practice Laws: Complex and Inconsistent  
As described above, an obvious way to alleviate the effects of the 
shortage of primary care physicians is through expanding the roles of 
physician extenders, including physician assistants (PAs) and NPs, in 
primary care.109 The amount of training needed for physician 
extenders is significantly less than for doctors so more of them can fill 
the primary care gap within a shorter time frame.  For example, a 
Robert Woods Johnson Foundation study determined that overall NP 
numbers had doubled relative to primary care doctors between 1995 
and 2009.110  A similar trend was also seen with PAs, suggesting that 
these health care providers could increase in number over a relatively 
short period of time to help meet the growing demand in healthcare.111  
Rural communities have long been disproportionately affected by 
this scarcity as they long have had difficulty luring sufficient numbers 
of doctors.112 In many of these communities, nurse practitioners (NPs) 
 
107. See Committee on the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Initiative on 
the Future of Nursing, INST. OF MED., NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, 
ADVANCING HEALTH 97 (2010), http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2010/The-
Future-of-Nursing-Leading-Change-Advancing-Health.aspx. 
108. See id; Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, U.S. D.O.J. & 
F.T.C. 1, 112 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/ 
040723healthcarerpt.pdf. 
109. See Spalter, supra note 12, at 171. 
110. Kevin M. Stange & Deborah A. Sampson, Nurse Practitioners and 
Physician Assistants in the United States: Current Patterns of 
Distribution and Recent Trends, http://thefutureofnursing.org/ 
NursingResearchNetwork7. 
111. See Joan Lynaugh, Nursing the Great Society: The Impact of the Nurse 
Training Act of 1964, 16 NURSING HIST. REV. 13, 24-25 (2008); see also 
LINDA H. AIKEN & ROBIN CHEUNG, NURSE WORKFORCE CHALLENGES IN 
THE UNITED STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY (2008).  
112. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, PRIMARY CARE 
WORKFORCE FACTS AND STATS NO. 3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE U.S. 
PRIMARY CARE WORKFORCE, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/pcwork3.htm. Even though primary care 
physicians are more likely than specialists to be in rural areas, they still 
tend to be concentrated in urban settings. In comparison to physicians, 
nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants are more likely to work in 
rural areas. 
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are playing a more prominent role in providing primary care.113  
Studies of nurse-managed care clinics (NMCs) have demonstrated 
that they can increase quality and access to care by reducing costs 
and improving utilization of preventive care.114  Yet, state scope of 
practice laws, licensing schemes, and payers’ reimbursement practices 
limit the potential use of these and other innovations to address the 
scarcity problem. For instance, in some states nurses are able to set 
up clinics to provide primary care services without direct physician 
oversight.  However, in other jurisdictions, nurses with the exact same 
training are not able to do this without paying fees to a doctor and 
entering into a collaboration agreement.  
In 2010, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a report on 
the future of nursing, which was spurred by the “need to assess and 
transform the nursing profession.”115
 
The report started with the 
concept that nurses should play an expanded role in the delivery of 
health care.116  A central finding of this report was that the existing 
scope of practice laws needed to be reformed to assure that nurses are 
able to practice to the full extent of their training. Yet, the IOM 
noted that efforts to achieve these expanded roles have been 
undermined by state medical board resistance, reimbursement 
limitations, professional tensions, and the fragmented nature of the 
health care system.117  Others have also noted that the greatest 
obstacle to the optimal use of physician extenders is the varied scope 
of practice laws employed by states.118  The IOM report notes that it 
is not even clear how different state laws are between one another.119 
That is because some states are very detailed about their scope of 
practice laws, while others contain vague provisions that leave much 
uncertainty as to their interpretation.120  However, a different study 
 
113. Tina Rosenberg, The Family Doctor, Minus the M.D., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
24, 2012), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/the-family-
doctor-minus-the-m-d/. 
114. Jennifer A. Coddington & Laura P. Sands, Costs of Health Care and 
Quality Outcomes of Patients at Nurse-Managed Clinics, 2 NURSING 
ECONOMIC$ 75 (2008).   
115. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING 
HEALTH, 2 (2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2010/The-
Future-of-Nursing-Leading-Change-Advancing-Health.aspx. 
116. Id. at 86. 
117. Id. at 9-11. 
118. See Carl F. Ameringer, State-based Licensure of Telemedicine: The 
Need for Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. 
& POL’Y 55, 68-70 (2012).   
119. See INST. OF MED., supra note 115, at 98. 
120. Id.  
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claims that intense lobbying battles over these statutes have in fact 
exacerbated state-specific differences in scope of practice parameters, 
leading to a system of laws that vary widely by state.121 
 
 
Not surprisingly, the AMA has consistently obstructed any 
attempts to reform scope of practice laws. To this end, in 2006 the 
AMA sponsored the formation of the Scope of Practice Partnership 
(SOPP), a committee of state medical and subspecialty associations.122  
The AMA designed the SOPP to serve as an organized front to 
challenge legislative efforts to expand the roles of “limited licensure 
health care providers,” or in other words non-physician health care 
providers.123  The SOPP, with the assistance of AMA staff attorneys, 
has developed and disseminated templates to enable other physician 
interests groups to quickly and effectively oppose scope of practice 
expansions.124 The AMA’s Litigation Center provides resources “to 
help defeat inappropriate scope of practice expansions,”125 and has 
expressed an intention to continue to do so in light of the AMA’s 
perception that the ACA’s emphasis on collaboration will result in a 
greater push toward expanded roles for non-physician health care 
providers.126  In addition, recent AMA resolutions have demonstrated 
an unwillingness to acknowledge the authority of boards designed to 
 
121. Tine Hansen-Turton et al., Insurers’ Contracting Policies on Nurse 
Practitioners as Primary Care Providers: Two Years Later, 9 POL’Y, 
POL. & NURSING PRACT. 241, 241 (2008).  
122. Myrle Croasdale, Physician Task Force Confronts Scope-Of-Practice 
Legislation: A New Coalition With Organized Medicine Cites Patient 
Safety As The Reason For Coming Together, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS 
(Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2006/ 
02/13/prl10213.htm; AM. MED. ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 
RESOLUTION 814: LIMITED LICENSURE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER TRAINING 
AND CERTIFICATION STANDARDS (2005), http://www.ama-
assn.org/meetings/public/interim05/refcomkannotateda05.doc. 
123. Croasdale, supra note 122. 
124. Edward L. Langston, Scope of Practice: Need for continuing dialogue, 
AM. MED. NEWS (Jun. 2, 2008), 
http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2008/06/02/edca0602.htm. 
125. State Legislative and Regulatory Prospectus, AM. MED. ASS’N, 8 (2012), 
http://www.amaassn.org/resources/doc/arc/state-leg-reg-prospectus-
2012.pdf; Case Summaries, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-
topics/litigation-center/case-summaries-topic/scopepractice.page?.; see 
also AMERICAN MED. ASS’N: ABOUT US, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/litigation-
center/about-us.page?. 
126. AM. MED. ASS’N, ADVOCACY RESOURCE CENTER, STATE HEALTH SYSTEM 
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION, (2012), http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/arc/x-ama/sop-workplan.pdf. 
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regulate the practices of other medical professionals (e.g., boards of 
nursing).127   
Predictably, the SOPP frames its advocacy efforts as being done 
for the benefit of patients.  It claims that it is addressing patient 
safety concerns stemming from the expansion of roles for medical 
professionals with less training than physicians. However, empirical 
research consistently demonstrates equivalent outcomes for using 
nurses in many contexts that have traditionally been reserved for 
doctors.128  In addition, there is a growing body of literature dedicated 
to studying inter-professional collaboration between the various actors 
in the health care system.129  Some of these studies have observed 
better outcomes and more efficient use of resources stemming from 
these types of collaborative environments.130  Thus, the SOPP’s stated 
position instead seems to be a pretext to advance the AMA’s true 
concern, that physicians have to increasingly compete with lower paid 
non-physicians.  
Of course, physician groups are not the only ones lobbying for 
outcomes related to scope of practice laws. At the beginning of 2012, 
the AMA’s Advocacy Resource center predicted that non-physician 
advocacy groups would become even more aggressive in the coming 
year.131 The AMA noted that over 400 scope of practice bills were 
introduced in state legislatures during 2011.132  Most notably, the 
AMA reported that advanced practice nurses in nearly twenty states 
were seeking to eliminate collaborative practice agreements requiring 
physician supervision over provision of anesthesia and pain 
management services.133  
The AMA and other associations that represent physician 
interests have historically had great success in defending the status 
 
127. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AMA RES. 902, NEED FOR 
ACTIVE MEDICAL BOARD OVERSIGHT OF MEDICAL SCOPE-OF-PRACTICE 
ACTIVITIES BY MID LEVEL PRACTITIONERS (2006), 
http://www.nursingworld.org/ 
MainMenuCategories/PolicyAdvocacy/State/ 
IssuesResources/APRN/AMAHODResolutions904_1.pdf. 
128. INST. OF MED., supra note 115, at 111.  
129. See, e.g., Anna R. Gagliardi et al., How can we improve cancer care? A 
Review of Interprofessional Models and Their Use in Clinical 
Management, 20 SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 146, 146 (2011). 
130. Id. at 151. 
131. 2012 State Legislative and Regulatory Prospectus, AM. MED. ASS’N, 8 
(2012), http://www.amaassn.org/resources/doc/arc/state-leg-reg-
prospectus-2012.pdf. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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quo regarding scope of practice of laws.  Nevertheless, nurse 
practitioners (NPs) have recently gained some ground with more and 
more states adopting laws authorizing them to practice primary care 
and prescribe drugs independently.134 Other states have developed new 
innovations such as varying collaboration-based requirements for the 
relationship between NPs and doctors.135
 
Yet, even where states de 
jure require supervision or collaboration, NPs are de facto often 
effectively able to work autonomously on a day to day basis by simply 
following a list of standing orders, or protocols, developed in 
collaboration with a physician.   
Many states also permit physician supervision to be done 
remotely, meaning direct patient care is in the hands of an NP.  
States also vary in what type of board regulates nurse practitioners. 
Many states now have joint boards composed of both doctors and 
nurse practitioners, whereas in other states a nursing board regulates 
the practice. In still other states, the Board of Nursing is given the 
authority to regulate NPs’ practice, but the Board of Medicine (which 
regulates physicians) is also permitted to enact regulations that 
impact the relationship between NPs and doctors. The net result is a 
lot of uncertainty among providers and institutions on how best to 
utilize and invest in providers of health care.  
3. The Case of Telemedicine: Erecting Barriers to Out-of-State Doctors  
A past effort to reform licensing laws to allow doctors to practice 
across state lines is illustrative of impediments to relaxing scope of 
practice regulation. As stated above, educational, residency, and 
specialty board standards are now effectively uniform across the 
states, but doctors still need to get licensed in their state before they 
can practice medicine in that locale. Telemedicine raised the 
possibility of using technology to treat certain kinds of cases without 
physical contact. However, under state licensing laws there was a lot 
of confusion as to how to regulate this type of practice.   
In 1996, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), a non-
profit that represents many medical boards in the United States, 
adopted a model act to regulate practice of medicine across state 
lines.136   The model act came at a point when many foresaw emerging 
technologies, particularly the internet and higher resolution imaging, 
as a means of removing geographic barriers to the practice of 
 
134. INST. OF MED., supra note 115, at 108. 
135. Id.at 98. 
136. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Telemedicine: A Model Act to 
Regulate the Practice of Medicine Across State Lines, FED’N O F  STATE 
MED. BDS OF THE U.S. (Apr. 1996), http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/ 
1996_grpol_Telemedicine.pdf.  
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medicine. By facilitating the adoption of telemedicine, the industry 
would be able to bring experts to underserved areas or reduce costs 
for visits that required minimal physical contact. However, 
cumbersome state licensing schemes prevented adoption of the new 
technology because doctors seeking to practice telemedicine found it 
too difficult to obtain state licensure for each state.  
The model act reflected the general consensus that the patient’s 
location should determine jurisdiction for the practice of medicine and 
that states should grant limited licenses to physicians wishing to 
engage in telemedicine to ensure that the practice could be possible.  
Physicians would still be subject to the state boards for their 
treatment of patients within the state, but they would not be required 
to go through full licensing procedures for each state.137  Nevertheless, 
only a handful of states ever acted on the model act’s 
recommendations.138 Many more states instead made explicit a 
continued prohibition of such unlicensed practice of telemedicine in 
their states, essentially condemning the viability of the practice. They 
defined unlicensed medicine to include practicing digitally from out-
of-state with a patient in-state without a complete license to practice 
medicine.  
These telemedicine policies by state boards, ostensibly for the 
protection of patients from incompetent physicians, instead reflect 
anti-competitive practices intended to favor in-state doctors.  As one 
critic noted, “Barring serious differences in the quality of care 
provided or improper use of distance technology, these discrepancies 
should not exist.”139
  
It is worth reiterating that this outcome 
occurred when efforts were undertaken to expand doctors’ freedom to 
practice.   
4. Federal Antitrust Enforcement  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has become increasingly 
involved in advocating for less restrictive scope of practice laws.  In 
the wake of the Institute of Medicine’s report on nursing and given 
expanded insurance coverage under the ACA’s individual mandate, 
many states that still require collaboration agreements are revisiting 
the practice. FTC comments on such proposals have recommended 
that “the licensure ensure that such limits [be] no stricter than 
patient protection requires” and that “[a]bsent a finding that there 
are countervailing patient care and safety concerns regarding APRN 
practice, suggestions to remove the collaborative agreement for 
prescriptive authority appear to be a procompetitive improvement in 
 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Ameringer, supra note 118, at 59. 
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the law that likely would benefit West Virginia health care 
consumers.”140
  
In particular, the Commission noted that “unnecessary 
restrictions on APRNs are likely to exacerbate access problems and 
thereby harm some of the most vulnerable populations.” This effect 
might be compounded in areas where physician shortages result in 
increased costs associated with or difficulty acquiring collaboration 
agreements.141 
Over the past decade, the FTC has targeted state dental boards 
for anti-competitive behavior.142  The FTC’s general position is that 
“a state may not give private market participants unsupervised 
authority to suppress competition even if they act through a formally 
designated ‘state agency’.”143  In North Carolina, the State Board of 
Dental Examiners (Board) regulates the practice of dentistry pursuant 
to North Carolina’s Dental Practice Act.144  The Board is comprised 
of eight members, of which six are licensed dentists—in other words, 
seventy-five percent of the Board is made up of “private market 
participants.”  In the 1990s, dentists started offering cosmetic teeth 
whitening services and earned significant professional fees for this 
process.145  But eventually, non-dentists started offering the exact 
same service, often in shopping mall kiosks, and at substantially lower 
 
140. FTC, STAFF LETTER TO WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE, PREPARED 
STATEMENT BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE A OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
HEALTH OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_document
s/ftc-staff-testimony-subcommittee-wv-legislature-laws-governing-scope-
practice-advanced-practice/120907wvatestimony.pdf.   
141. FTC, LETTER TO LOUISIANA STATE REPRESENTATIVES WILLMOTT AND 
WILLIAMS (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-louisiana-house-representatives-
likely-competitive-impact-louisiana-house-bill-
951/120425louisianastaffcomment.pdf.  
142. See e.g., Complaint, South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, No. 9311 
(F.T.C. 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/socodentistcomp.pdf. 
See also FTC OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, LETTER TO NORTH 
CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE LAROQUE (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_document
s/ftc-staff-letter-nc-representative-stephen-laroque-concerning-nc-house-
bill-698-and-regulation/1205ncdental.pdf. 
143. FTC, STATEMENT BY FTC CHAIRWOMAN EDITH RAMIREZ ON U.S. 
SUPREME COURT RULINGREGARDING NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL BOARD 
MATTER (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/02/statement-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez-us-supreme-
court-ruling. 
144. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) 
(slip op.) [hereinafter N.C. Board v. FTC] 
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prices.146 Responding to complaints from dentists who saw their teeth 
whitening business shrinking, the Board issued official cease-and-
desist letters to non-dentists offering this service and to product 
manufacturers that provided their supplies.  The Board warned that 
unlicensed practice of dentistry was a crime and also sent letters to 
shopping malls, advising that they should expel tenants that offered 
these services. In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an 
administrative complaint against the Board, citing that its action was 
an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Then, in 2011, the 
FTC issued an order requiring that the Board stop sending 
communications intended to prevent non-dentists from offering teeth 
whitening services. 
Early on, the FTC’s action raised concerns at the AMA.  The 
FTC was sending a clear signal that it was making anti-competitive 
behavior of all state medical boards, not just dental boards, a top 
priority.  Tellingly, as the Board appealed the FTC’s decision to the 
Fourth Circuit, the AMA offered litigation support and filed an 
amicus brief in favor of the Board.147 Whereas an earlier FTC order 
against South Carolina’s dental board addressed restrictions imposed 
despite state legislative efforts to the contrary,148
 
the North Carolina 
case was more troubling to the AMA because the FTC order charged 
the Board with imposing anti-competitive practice restrictions in an 
area where the state dental statute was silent.149  
The FTC order emphasized that the majority of Board members 
earned a living by practicing dentistry and concluded that, “given the 
Board’s obvious interest in the challenged restraint, the state must 
actively supervise the Board in order for the Board to claim state 
action protection from the antitrust laws.”150
  
In its defense, the 
Board argued that under Parker v. Brown, federal antitrust laws 
cannot apply to their activities as they are sovereign state actions.151  
In Parker, the Court developed a two prong test for state action 
immunity where private actors are involved in restraining commerce: 
 
146. Id. 
147. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 818 
(2010).  
148. Complaint, South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, No. 9311 (F.T.C. 
2003),  http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/socodentistcomp.pdf.   
149. Complaint at 3-4, N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners (F.T.C. June 17, 
2010) (No. 9343), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/100617dentalexamcmpt.pdf.   
150. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 151 F.T.C. 607, 608 (2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/110208commopinion.pdf. 
151. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  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(1) the restraint is “clearly articulated” and “affirmatively expressed 
as state policy,” and (2) “the policy must be actively supervised by 
the State itself.”152
   
Subsequently in Midcal, the Court found that a California system 
for wine pricing did not satisfy the Parker test because the State 
merely authorized price setting generally, but did not set prices, 
enforce them, or review them for reasonableness.153
  
In contrast to 
Midcal, the Court in Town of Hallie held that municipalities can avail 
themselves of the doctrine if they are able to meet the first prong 
because unlike private actors, there is a presumption that 
municipalities operate in the public interest.154
  
Under Town of Hallie, 
the state legislature need not expressly state its intention for the 
authorization to have anti-competitive effects; there need only be a 
“clearly articulated” state policy and anti-competitive conduct that 
was a foreseeable consequence of that policy.155
 
In an amicus brief, the AMA and several state medical boards 
argued that boards, like municipalities, should be entitled to state 
action immunity “regardless of the composition of those boards” and 
without active state oversight.156
  
The AMA warned that although the 
case appears before the court in the guise of an action targeting teeth 
whitening practices, “the FTC order would greatly impede state 
regulation of the practice of medicine, with a devastating impact on 
public health (nationally).”157
 
The AMA also published a white paper 
condemning the FTC’s actions as a threat to the important scope 
delineating function these boards were intended serve.158
  
 
In the white paper, the AMA argued that dicta in the Court’s 
decision in Town of Hallie, supports the Board’s position that medical 
board actions should be immune to antitrust actions subject only to 
meeting the first prong of Parker test.159 In that decision, the Court 
 
152. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U.S. 97, 105 (1980).   
153. Id. at 105-106.  
154. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985).   
155. Id.  
156. Brief for The American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 8, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-1172)., http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/legal-issues/ncsbde-v-ftc.pdf.   
157. Id. at 2. 
158. AM. MED. ASS’N, APPLICATION OF THE STATE ACTION ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION TO ACTIONS OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, (2012), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/state-action-antitrust-
exemption-white-paper-2012.pdf.  
159. Id. at 7. 
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noted that “it is likely that active state supervision would also not be 
required” for state agencies acting subordinate to the state’s 
legislature. The AMA asserted that like municipalities, and unlike the 
acts of private persons, state boards can be overturned by legislative 
actions and are subject to judicial review.160
 
Further, the AMA argued 
that while there are fewer political checks on medical boards, 
compared with municipal government, enabling statutes typically 
require adherence to processes to assure transparency and statutes 
generally prohibit the types campaign contribution-type influences.161
 
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit upheld the FTC’s order.  In 2015, the 
Board appealed to Supreme Court, but lost in a 6-3 decision as the 
majority (including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy) 
affirmed the FTC’s position in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission.162  The Court held that the 
Board was acting as a private actor, and since there was no evidence 
of state supervision, the Board was not entitled to state action 
immunity.163  This decision is significant for several reasons.  First, it 
indicates that the Roberts Court does not see federal oversight of 
state medical licensing schemes as per se violations of state 
sovereignty.  Second, this validates the FTC’s earlier advocacy 
positions that licensure requirements should be no more restrictive 
than required by patient safety and that overly restrictive laws harm 
the public interest by exacerbating preexisting healthcare access 
problems.  But third, it does not automatically signal the death knell 
for physician groups like the AMA and CMA that want state boards 
to maintain restrictive scope of practice and licensing laws—they 
simply have to ensure that state boards have some measure of state 
“supervision” over them.  The bigger picture is that in light of this 
legal victory, one can expect the FTC to take on a more aggressive 
anti-competitive stance which in turn could nudge state medical 
boards to adopting more liberalized licensure and scope of practice 
laws.  In other words, pushing for the public to have access to lower 
cost teeth whitening technology in shopping malls or at homes, is not 
that different from advocating that non-physicians using mobile 
health technologies should be able to offer these lower cost and more 
accessible healthcare services free from anticompetitive state 
regulations.            
 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. N.C. State Bd. of Med. Examin’rs v. F.T.C., 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
163. Id. 
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IV. American Healthcare and the Case for Disruptive 
Innovation  
A.  The Intertwined Problems of Healthcare Costs and Access 
If nothing changes in the American healthcare system, the 
physician shortage is expected to increase by ten-fold between 2010 
and 2025.164  This problem can manifest itself in terrible ways.  For 
instance, a whistle-blower at a VA hospital in Phoenix alleged there 
were “secret waiting lists” for patients that were kept off the official 
books in order to create “a misleading portrayal of veterans’ access to 
patient care.”165 Bonuses for V.A. hospital administrators were tied to 
measures of access, including waiting times for appointments.166 
However, the V.A. is woefully underfunded and understaffed, 
especially as increased levels of veterans were coming back from Iraq 
and Afghanistan seeking both routine and complex care.167  A 
subsequent federal investigation not only confirmed this practice in 
Phoenix, but across V.A. facilities nationwide.  At the Phoenix 
hospital, an investigation concluded that 1,700 patients were placed 
on these secret lists and many may have never received medical 
care.168  The Phoenix V.A. and many other facilities also simply 
lacked the physical space to see more patients.169  Even more 
disturbing, an official from the inspector’s general office “testified that 
delays for care had contributed to some patient deaths.”170  In the 
 
164. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges, Physician Shortages to Worsen Without 
Increases in Residency Training, 
https://www.aamc.org/download/153160/data/physician_shortages_to
_worsen_without_increases_in_residency_tr.pdf. See also Jack M. 
Colwill, James M. Cultice & Robin L. Kruse, Will Generalist Physician 
Supply Meet Demands of an Increasing and Aging Population? 27 
HEALTH AFF. w232 (2008).  
165. Richard Oppel, Some Top Officials Knew of V.A. Woes, Before the 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/ 
us/politics/high-level-knowledge-before-veterans-affairs-scandal.html. 
166. Richard Oppel & Michael Shear, Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid 
Waiting Lists at Hospitals, N.Y.TIMES (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/05/29/us/va-report-confirms-improper-waiting-lists-at-phoenix-
center.html. 
167. Richard Oppel, Doctor Shortage is Cited in Delays at V.A. Hospitals, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/ 
us/doctor-shortages-cited-in-va-hospital-waits.html. 
168. Oppel, supra note 165. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
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aftermath of this scandal, the V.A. disclosed that it was short over 
28,000 doctors, nurses and other staff.171  Further, the V.A. 
acknowledged that it is having a difficult time recruiting doctors to 
fill open positions because it pays less ($98,000 to $195,000 for 
primary care) than the private sector ($221,000 median primary care 
income), but still has significant patient loads.172    
Further, while the ACA has led to expansion of affordable 
insurance coverage and Medicaid eligibility in participating states, 
insurance coverage by itself does not guarantee timely access to care.  
A recent study found that for callers attempting to make a specialty 
care appointment for children on Medicaid-CHIP (Children’s Health 
Insurance Program), 66% were denied the ability to even make an 
appointment (compared to 11% denial for callers reporting Blue Cross 
Blue Shield insurance).173  In addition, once they were able to find a 
specialist who accepted Medicaid-CHIP, the children had to wait on 
average 42 days (compared to an 20 day average wait with private 
insurance).174  The healthcare access problems children face through 
Medicaid-CHIP is also scandalous, but has not made similar 
headlines.  The problem here is the same as with the V.A.; Medicaid-
CHIP pays less in reimbursements than private insurance, so many 
doctors refuse to see such patients, increasing patient loads on those 
who do accept such payments.   
Throwing more money at the V.A. and the Medicaid might 
mitigate some of the access problems related to undersupply, but this 
seems like an unsustainable long-term solution given other budgetary 
constraints.  Medicare and Social Security are the two biggest 
entitlement programs and both face solvency crises in the near future.  
A recent government forecast indicates that Medicare’s financial 
stability has improved under the ACA, but this only means that the 
fund which covers hospital costs is projected to go insolvent in 2030, 
as opposed to 2026.175  The situation for Social Security is more dire, 
as the fund that pays monthly benefits for those with disabilities will 
 
171. Id. 
172. Oppel, supra note 167. 
173. Joanna Bisgaier & Karin Rhodes, Auditing Access to Specialty Care for 
Children with Public Insurance, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2324, 2328 
(2011). 
174. Id. 
175. Amy Goldstein, Medicare Finances Improve Partly Due to ACA, 
Hospital Expenses, Trustee Report Says, WASH. POST (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/medicare-
finances-improve-due-to-aca-lower-hospital-expenses-social-security-
stays-the-same-trustee-report-says/2014/07/28/5db1a2a2-165a-11e4-
9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html 
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start to run short starting in 2016.  With these seemingly intractable 
budgetary problems, it does seem as if a paradigm shift is truly 
needed to bend the cost curve in order to improve healthcare access.  
B.  Mobile Health as Disruptive Innovation 
Disruptive innovation refers to a breakthrough that builds on a 
product or service in ways that are unappreciated by those 
established in the industry.176 Typically, while disruptive innovations 
offer worse product performance, they provide other features that 
consumers value (e.g., “cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, 
more convenient to use”).177 However, entrenched stakeholders may 
not adequately invest in these new breakthroughs, preferring instead 
to meet the demands of their existing customer base.178  Entrenched 
stakeholders do this by producing “sustaining innovation,” or in other 
words products that offer higher profit margins by meeting high-end 
customer demands.179   
In many ways, the traditional application of technology in 
medicine has followed this “sustaining innovation” paradigm.  Think 
about x-rays versus MRIs and CT scans, canes and walkers versus 
artificial joint replacements, calorie-restricted diets versus bariatric 
surgery—the latter are all higher margin, higher cost procedures.  In 
 
176. Joseph Bower & Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: 
Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. J. 43, 47 (1995) (“A company’s revenue 
and cost structures play a critical role in the way it evaluates proposed 
technological innovations. Generally, disruptive technologies look 
financially unattractive to established companies. The potential 
revenues from the discernible markets are small, and it is often difficult 
to project how big the markets for the technology will be over the long 
term. As a result, managers typically conclude that the technology 
cannot make a meaningful contribution to corporate growth and 
therefore, that it is not worth the management effort required to 
develop it.”) 
177. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 81, at xv. 
178. Bower & Christensen, supra note 176 (“The problem is that managers 
keep doing what has worked in the past: serving the rapidly growing 
needs of their current customers. The processes that successful, well-
managed companies have developed to allocate resources among 
proposed investments are incapable of funneling resources into programs 
that current customers explicitly don’t want and whose profit margins 
seem unattractive.”). 
179. Lesley Curtis & Kevin Schulman, Overregulation of Health Care: 
Musings on Disruptive Theory, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 195, 197 (2006) 
(“Early innovators enter markets with basic products that meet the 
needs of a segment of the market. Over time, innovators improve the 
product’s capabilities (‘sustaining innovation’) to meet the demands of 
high-end customers, who offer potentially higher margins and more 
profitable markets.”). 
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contrast, disruptive innovation occurs when a new product “enter[s] 
the market at a lower level of sophistication, rapidly progresses to 
meet the needs of the majority of consumers in the marketplace and, 
as a result, captures market share from well-established firms.”180 This 
eventually leaves established industry leaders in the lurch.181  
Convergence of well-known technologies can also be disruptive—a 
good example of this can be seen in camera phones.182 Apple claimed 
back in 2013 that the iPhone is now “the world’s most popular 
camera,” with more pictures taken on their phones than any other 
device.183 The reason the iPhone’s camera is the most popular is not 
because it takes the best pictures. It is rather because it fits in your 
pocket, is easy to use, and is already bundled into the price of a 
smartphone.   
Smartphones are already potent little sensors capable of capturing 
large quantities of data for a diversity of purposes.184 Given this, 
mobile technology companies like Apple realize that the same 
dynamics (easy to use, already in your pocket, inexpensive) that 
enabled them to disrupt the photography industry can specifically be 
applied to healthcare.  To this end, in 2014, Apple announced the 
release of its “Healthkit” software platform that according to Craig 
Federighi, Apple’s senior vice president of software engineering, will 
 
180. Id. 
181. Bower & Christensen, supra note 176 (“[M]anagers typically see 
themselves as having two choices when deciding whether to pursue 
disruptive technologies. One is to go downmarket and accept the lower 
profit margins of the emerging markets that the disruptive technologies 
will initially serve. The other is to go upmarket with sustaining 
technologies and enter market segments whose profit margins are 
alluringly high... Any rational resource-allocation process in companies 
serving established markets will choose going upmarket rather than 
going down.”) See also, Maxwell Wessel, Stop Reinventing Disruption, 
HBR BLOG NETWORK (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/03/stop_reinventing_disruption.html 
(“Disruption is a story of rational responses to a changing environment. 
It’s the sensible retreat from your low margin business towards you 
more demanding, more profitable customers. At least, it’s a sensible 
retreat until you recognize that you’ve given away your business and 
there is nowhere left to run.”). 
182. See Fredrik Hacklin, How Incremental Innovation Becomes Disruptive: 
The Case Of Technology Convergence, 1 INT’L ENGINEERING MGMT. 
CONF.  32, 34 (2004).  
183. IPhone: Features, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ 
(accessed May 11, 2013). 
184. See, e.g., Roberta Kwok, Phoning in Data, 458 NATURE 959 (2009) 
(discussing the proliferation of projects to use mobile phones in diverse 
disciplines). 
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enable the creation of “a vast array of healthcare apps for monitoring 
things like heart rate, weight, blood pressure and glucose levels for 
people with diabetes.”185  Moreover, Apple is working with Epic 
Systems (industry leader in EMR with over 100 million patient 
records) and providers like the Mayo Clinic and the Cleveland Clinic 
to transform smartphones into medical grade devices that can be 
equipped to enable self-treatment (e.g., perform diagnostic tests, 
monitor chronic diseases) and enhanced provider treatment (e.g., 
clinical decision-support software linked to patients EMR).186 
For the V.A., Medicaid, and other healthcare plans generally, lack 
of doctors and clinical openings for outpatient care is something that 
mobile health theoretically could solve.  Physician extenders could 
visit veterans at their homes to deliver care, or parents could schedule 
visits for children at their schools and videoconference in on their 
smartphones if they cannot take time off of work.  Retail medical 
clinics, which already exist in places such as Walgreens, CVS and 
Walmart, could start offering more than their currently limited 
services and thus perform a greater role in alleviating cost and access 
issues.187  
To fully realize the potential of disruptive technology, those 
investing in it must first gain entry to the market. As Curtis and 
Schulman have noted, “[t]he presence of regulation, however, may 
effectively prevent disruptive technological improvements from 
occurring.”188 This might occur even though disruptive innovations 
“often can subsequently become fully performance-competitive within 
 
185. Phil Goldstein, Apple Moves Into Mobile Healthcare with HealthKit 
Software, Fierce Wireless, FIERCE WIRELESS (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/apple-moves-mobile-healthcare-
healthkit-software/2014-06-02. 
186. Id. 
187. See Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 2-3 (describing how the health 
care industry is “overshooting the needs of average customers.” In 
particular hospitals have overshot the needs of most with “impressive 
technological ability to deliver care [...] to address the needs of a 
relatively small population of very sick patients... Most types of patients 
that occupied hospital beds 20 years ago are not there today; they’re 
being treated in lower cost, more-focused setting... As a consequence, 
the old high-cost institutions can’t compete financially; nore are there 
enough really sick people to sustain them.” More recently, Topol has 
predicted the “steady demise of hospitals and clinics,” observing that 
“[t]he most frequent cause of hospitalizations, such as congestive heart 
failure, asthma, and chronic obstructive lung disease, are all eminently 
amenable to digital medical strategies that forego inpatient facilities.”) 
See TOPOL, supra note 76, at 234. 
188. Curtis & Schulman, supra note 179, at 198. 
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the mainstream market against established products.”189  Indeed, far 
from erecting barriers to mobile health technology, the federal 
government seems to have gone out of its way to promote this 
industry.  As other scholars have noted, the federal government has 
taken a relatively laissez-faire approach to the mobile health industry, 
with the FDA promulgating very industry-friendly regulations for 
mobile health app and sensor developers and almost no regulations at 
all for consumer handset manufacturers like Apple and Samsung.190   
Further, the FTC has been probing the defenses of restrictive 
state-based licensing and scope of practice schemes for the last decade 
by going after relatively small prey, like dental boards restricting 
teeth whitening services.  However, with the Court validating that 
state licensing boards cannot automatically rely on state action 
immunity, the future portends a more aggressive FTC going after 
more state boards for anti-competitive regulations in the medical 
licensing and scope of practice arena.  Thus, what will legally stand in 
the way of the putative mobile health revolution is not the federal 
government, and maybe not even state governments (which is 
especially significant in light of North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners), but just state medical boards.  If the mobile health 
industry could use its influence to introduce an explicit rift between a 
state legislature and any perceived anti-competitive measures by the 
state medical board, the board loses—the FTC set that precedent 
when it won against South Carolina’s dental board in 2003.191   
Recognizing that “tech disruption requires overcoming political 
and regulatory barriers,” Uber hired political strategist David Plouffe 
to literally take on the global taxi industry.192  Plouffe was President 
Obama’s wunderkind campaign adviser who successfully merged 
electoral politics with social media technology—in other words he is a 
disruptive innovator.  In taking on the taxi industry, Plouffe outlined 
his method, “To the extent that there are barriers, then we have to 
have a strategy to eliminate those barriers.”193  He further elaborated, 
“We’ll be trying the change the view of established politicians, and 
there’s a lot of resistance coming from people who want to protect the 
 
189. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 81, at xxvii. 
190. See Cortez et al., supra note 20. 
191. See Complaint, S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, (F.T.C. 2003) (No. 9311), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/socodentistcomp.pdf. 
192. Emily Badger & Zachary Goldfarb, Uber Hired David Plouffe When It 
Realized ‘Techies’ Can’t Do Politics,  WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/19/uber-
hired-david-plouffe-when-it-realized-techies-cant-do-politics/. 
193. Id. 
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status quo.”194  This begs the question, if Uber can hire David Plouffe 
to influence legislators, just imagine who the mobile health industry 
could deploy to spread its message (e.g., Bill Clinton, Chris Christie, 
etc.) to state legislators.  However, given the significant healthcare 
access and cost concerns that the states and their citizens face, and 
the actual potential of mobile health to address these problems, why 
should states be wary of the “Uberization” of healthcare?  The answer 
is jobs and health care security.    
 
V.  Proposal:  United we stand, divided we fall 
 
GARY COLEMAN: Right now you are down and out and feeling 
really crappy.  
NICKY: I’ll say.  
 
GARY COLEMAN: And when I see how sad you are, 
it sort of makes me...Happy!  
 
NICKY: Happy?!  
 
GARY COLEMAN: Sorry, Nicky, human nature—nothing I can 
do!  
 
It’s...Schadenfreude! Making me feel glad that I’m not you.195 
“Schadenfreude” 
 
-Avenue Q the Musical 
 
A.  Achieving Expanded Scope of Practice Without a Faustian Bargain 
Nurses, psychologists, physician assistants, pharmacists, 
chiropractors, physical therapists, midwives, doulas, radiology 
technicians, herbalists, and other non-physician medical providers 
have been on the losing end of many licensing and scope of practice 
battles with physician groups and physician-dominated state medical 
boards, not to mention typically being on the losing end of 
interpersonal interactions with physicians in the clinical setting due to 
 
194. Kevin Robillard, David Plouffe’s Next Campaign: Steer Uber To 
Victory, POLITICO (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/david-plouffe-uber-110164.html. 
195. Robert Lopez et al., “Schadenfreude,” Avenue Q the Musical:  Original 
Broadway Cast Recording,  RCA Victor (2003). 
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professional power imbalances.196  It would be understandable if these 
non-physician groups allied themselves with the mobile health 
industry with the understanding that such an alliance would help 
them achieve long-standing goals of legally expanding their scopes of 
practice and breaking the political dominance physician groups have 
had over state legislatures and licensing boards.  Further, enhancing 
their skill sets with mobile health technologies could conceivably 
increase their client base and economic prospects.  However, as I 
describe below, in the long-term that is likely a Faustian bargain. 
Paradoxically, I propose that a better strategy for non-physician 
groups would be to ally with physician groups (who already have a 
sophisticated political and legal apparatus) to protect against the 
possibility that they too will be squeezed out by the mobile health 
industry in its quest for maximal profits and “providerless” medicine.  
In exchange for this alliance, they could demand that physician 
groups support expanded scope of practice for these physician 
extender groups. Further, since many mobile health applications will 
initially leverage the significant investments in training and education 
by medical professionals, I propose that it is equitable to demand that 
the mobile health industry pay for this in the form of a federal excise 
tax on mobile health transactions that would help fund future medical 
education costs and offer debt relief for medical professionals having 
difficulty paying back student loans.  Lastly, I argue that a sufficient 
“standing army” of medical professionals is necessary to maintain our 
healthcare security and one way to ensure this supply to enact a 15-
20 year safe-harbor regulation, that requires any medical diagnoses or 
treatment (excepting over the counter remedies) to be mediated by a 
human medical professional, and not just a mobile device or app.            
B.  The Uberization of Healthcare 
1. Your Current Profession?  There’s an App for That 
A disruptive innovation related to the iPhone camera is 
Instagram, the wildly successful photo-sharing mobile app.  However, 
as Silicon Valley futurist Jaron Lanier has pointed out, there is a 
dark-side to overnight tech sensations that is often overlooked: 
At the height of its power, the photography company Kodak 
employed more than 140,000 people and was worth $28 billion. 
They even invented the first digital camera. But today Kodak is 
bankrupt, and the new face of digital photography has become 
Instagram. When Instagram was sold to Facebook for a billion 
dollars in 2012, it employed only 13 people.  
 
196. See SAMUEL SHEM, THE HOUSE OF GOD (1978) (In my opinion, even after 
all of these years, this novel remains the definitive narrative of the 
power struggles that go on behind in the scenes in a hospital.) 
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Where did all those jobs disappear? And what happened to the 
wealth that all those middle-class jobs created?197 
Similarly, economist Paul Krugman remarked that in contrast to 
the General Motors of the 1950s and 1960s, companies like Apple 
today are “barely tethered to the material world.”198 Even as Apple is 
one of the highest-valued companies in the United States, it employs 
a mere “less than .05 percent of our workers.”199  In other words, the 
billions of dollars wealth associated with companies like Apple, 
Google, and Facebook has not led to meaningful job creation.   
With concerns that the shrinking middle class and ultra-
concentration of wealth might be distorting our democracy,200 one 
bright spot for the growth of middle class jobs has been the 
healthcare industry.  Doctors are making less than they used to in 
real terms, but they still earn at the top of the income spectrum.  
However, adjusted for inflation, registered nurses are now making 55% 
more than they did three decades ago and represent the third largest 
middle-income occupation.201  To demonstrate this growth, in 1980, 
1.4 million jobs in healthcare paid a middle-class wage ($40,000-
$80,000 in inflation adjusted dollars); now that figure it up to 4.5 
million.202  Further, the U.S. Department of Labor projects that this 
trend will continue so that by 2022 more than half of the new 9.1 
million consumer-related jobs will be in healthcare.  In addition, 
unlike the multi-billion dollar tech and financial companies situated in 
Silicon Valley or New York,  healthcare jobs are widely disseminated 
across the country, so they can serve as stable economic anchors even 
in depressed regions.  But depending on how states approach licensing 
and scope of practice laws, more of these middle class jobs might be 
enabled through mobile health technology, or more of these jobs 
might simply go the way of Kodak.  It might be hard to imagine this 
 
197. JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 2 (2013).    
198. Paul Krugman, Profits Without Production, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/opinion/krugman-profits-without-
production.html. 
199. Id. 
200. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2014).  See also Joel Kotkin, In the Future We’ll All Be 
Renters: America’s Disappearing Middle Class, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 
10, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/10/in-the-
future-we-ll-all-be-renters-america-s-disappearing-middle-class.html.   
201. Dionne Searcy et al., Health Care Opens Stable Career Path, Taken 
Mainly By Women, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23 /business/economy/health-care-
opens-middle-class-path-taken-mainly-by-women.html?_r=0. 
202. Id. 
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scenario since mobile health is still in its infancy, thus I will turn to 
the more “mature” example of Uber (which launched in 2010).       
While taxi companies have claimed that Uber is threatening their 
existence and the jobs of their employees,203 Uber’s cheery response 
has been that it is creating 50,000 new “driver jobs” per month and 
that its 80/20 fee splitting model allows its drivers to make more 
money than cab drivers.204  However, the long-term stability of these 
“driver jobs” is not clear, there is evidence that full-time drivers 
cannot earn a living wage after accounting for expenses, and Uber 
considers its drivers to be independent contractors to avoid paying 
them benefits.  
Some drivers have reported that Uber has lowered their fees so 
much in order to gain customers and drive out competitors that, 
“With some rides, you actually might be losing money . . . So, the 
money’s just, you know, not there—and you’re putting wear and tear 
on your car.”205 Consequently, many Uber drivers have cut back to 
only driving peak periods when there is “surge pricing” since driving 
full time could mean the following: “[I]n reality Uber was making 
more money than I was . . . I had to pay taxes, gas, mileage and for 
car maintenance and repairs. I was spending time and making $3 per 
hour.”206 One might contend that Uber’s strategy is merely a short-
term one to undermine the viability of the traditional taxi industry, 
which seems to be occurring as taxi medallion prices are cratering.207  
One also might argue that if competition from traditional taxis is 
largely eliminated, then Uber will logically raise the amount its 
drivers earn, because it cannot alienate its entire labor force if it 
wants to survive and make money.  But here’s the dark punchline, 
Uber has both the desire and the technical gameplan to alienate its 
entire labor force and make even more money.   
 
203. Simone Pathe, What it’s Really Like to be an Uber Driver, PBS 
NEWSHOUR MAKING SENSE BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014 11:50 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/what-its-really-like-to-be-
an-uber-driver/. 
204. Luz Lazo, Some Uber Drivers Say Company’s Promise of Big Pay Day 
Doesn’t Match Reality, WASH. POST (Sep. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/some-uber-
drivers-say-companys-promise-of-big-pay-day-doesnt-match-
reality/2014/09/06/17f5d82c-224a-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html. 
205. See Pathe, supra note 203 (interview by Diane Lincoln Estes with Bob). 
206. See Lazo, supra note 204. 
207. Josh Barro, Drop in Taxi Medallion Prices Continues as Rivals 
Multiply, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/upshot/new-york-city-taxi-
medallion-prices-keep-falling-now-down-about-25-percent.html.  
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At a tech conference in May 2014, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick 
expressed the following vision for his company: 
[T]he reason Uber could be expensive is because you’re not just 
paying for the car—you’re paying for the other dude in the car. 
When there’s no other dude in the car, the cost of taking an 
Uber anywhere becomes cheaper than owning a vehicle. So the 
magic there is, you basically bring the cost below the cost of 
ownership for everybody, and then car ownership goes away.208 
To get closer to this vision, the company recently launched the 
Uber Advanced Technologies Center in Pittsburgh to develop 
driverless cars in conjunction with Carnegie-Mellon University.  Uber 
might be able to roll out this technology sooner rather than one might 
expect, because the proof of concept already exists—Google’s self-
driving cars have already driven hundreds of thousands of miles.209   
Seen from another angle, Uber is instrumentalizing its drivers in 
two ways.  First, it is using drivers as political pawns to advance its 
deregulatory agenda.  It is trying to accomplish this by appealing to 
lawmakers claim that Uber will be able to create even more “driver 
jobs” if regulatory barriers protecting  “Big Taxi” (an actual term put 
into parlance by Uber)210 and its monopolistic pricing are eliminated.  
But, since Uber actually wants driverless cars, this is a disingenuous 
claim.  Second, Uber is leveraging its drivers’ investments in their 
own cars as a technology and regulatory bridging solution until it can 
develop driverless cars and receive regulatory approval to use them on 
public roads.   
2. The Endgame:  Providerless Medicine 
In the mobile health context, one can imagine the exact same 
strategy carried out by mobile health technology companies.  Initially, 
the rise of mobile health will be framed as an endeavor that will 
create more middle class jobs as nurses and physician assistants 
augmented by artificial intelligence apps and automated sensors can 
 
208. Alex Hern, Are driverless cars the future of Uber?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/03/are-
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209. Matt McFarland, Google’s Artificial Intelligence Breakthrough May 
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(Feb. 25, 2015), 
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210. Nancy Scola, Uber, allies kick off campaign to brand “Big Taxi.” WASH. 
POST (Sep. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
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take on more primary care duties that are typically done by doctors.  
When physician groups like the AMA predictably challenge such 
practices as violating scope of practice and licensing laws, the mobile 
health industry will hit back hard against “Big Medicine” and portray 
physicians as exploiting government regulations to make monopolistic 
earnings at the expense of patients, taxpayers, and a broader pool of 
middle class healthcare jobs.  Further, the foot soldiers in the mobile 
health industry’s fight in state legislatures will be nurses and other 
physician extenders, who after years of being outgunned by physician 
groups in the corridors of power, might welcome the political and 
economic clout an alliance with Apple, Google, and other tech 
companies might bring.  But, the defanging of physician interest 
groups might be the worst thing in the world for non-physician 
providers.   
As with Uber and its current drivers, the alliance of the mobile 
health industry with physician extenders might only be a temporary 
one, a bridging solution until mobile health technology becomes more 
robust.  Thus, if extensive deregulation occurs at the state level to 
enable mobile health technology, the next biggest expense to 
eliminate, aside from doctors, is of course physician extenders.  If 
mobile health devices can remotely monitor your dietary intake, 
physical activity, vital signs, your blood chemistry, pharmaceutical 
levels, and constantly upload this to an EMR platform, the mobile 
health industry can make the enticing pitch to the general public 
listed below.   
Who would you want diagnosing the medical importance of all 
this data and recommending treatment options?  One, a physician 
extender with perhaps a community college degree?  Or two, the AI 
program that can not only trounce those two nerds on Jeopardy!,211 
but also can engage in “machine learning” so that its algorithms 
improve with every bit of patient information added to EMRs on a 
personal and population-wide basis? Plus, relying solely on the AI 
program will cost consumers and taxpayers less than including a 
medical provider in the transaction.  The vision outlined above, that 
is the endgame in the Uberization of healthcare.      
3. The Threat to Healthcare Security 
Here is the problem with the above scenario: technologically we 
are far closer to driverless taxis than to providerless medicine, and the 
mobile health and medical field knows that as well.  But even before 
 
211. No disrespect intended to Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter.  I also made 
it onto Jeopardy!, but unlike them I could only win the second place 
prize, plus some Garlique and Turtle Wax as “parting gifts.” FAZAL 
KAHN, J ARCHIVE (Jul. 8, 1997), http://www.j-
archive.com/showplayer.php?player_id=1563.  
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providerless medicine becomes feasible, the mere specter of it lurking 
in the shadows: and the fact that it might be legal in the near future 
would be enough to massively disrupt the healthcare industry. 
Imagine the current pre-med undergraduates who will be needed to 
replace the massive cohort of baby boomer physicians entering 
retirement.  Will they see the writing on the wall and logically ask 
why they should invest the best years of their youth and take on debt 
equivalent to a small mortgage to enter into a dying profession with 
declining wages?  What happens to nursing students who realize that 
their potential careers might be in jeopardy before they hit the age of 
thirty?  
Even if mobile health technology eventually lives up to its heady 
promise some years down the line, what happens in the interim 
transitional period?  What happens to our healthcare security when 
needed medical professionals are scared away from making a multi-
year and expensive commitment because they might become obsolete 
as soon as their training period is over?  This is one crucial area 
where the Uber analogy breaks down.  If Uber drives out a significant 
portion of the traditional taxi supply before it (or Google) develops 
driverless taxi service, society will still have enough transportation 
options to weather this disruption.  However, how long of a disruptive 
period can we tolerate with a severely deficient supply of medical 
expertise?  Five years?  Ten years?  This is a question that lawmakers 
need to consider years before there is a potential exodus from the 
medical profession.      
Professions such as lawyers and accountants have felt the sting of 
automation and have had to adapt as well.  Further, every profession 
that requires a significant investment in time and money carries risk 
in terms of return on that investment.  But as the Court recognized 
in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the states as 
sovereign actors are free to politically determine when it is in their 
best interest to legally restrain competition:   
The States, however, when acting in their respective realm, need 
not adhere in all contexts to a model of unfettered competition. 
While “the States regulate their economies in many ways not 
inconsistent with the antitrust laws,” [ ], in some spheres 
they impose restrictions on occupations, confer exclusive or 
shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise limit 
competition to achieve public objectives. If every duly 
enacted state law or policy were required to conform to the 
mandates of the Sherman Act, thus promoting competition 
at the expense of other values a State may deem 
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fundamental, federal antitrust law would impose an 
impermissible burden on the States’ power to regulate.212 
In other words, while there may be no legally principled reason to 
protect highly skilled medical professionals from competition, states 
do have the sovereign right to erect legal barriers to competition in 
order to advance their own policy objectives.   
Physician interest groups are sophisticated, so they will perceive 
the combination of physician extenders and mobile health 
technologies as grave threats to their professional and economic 
interests and dig their heels in to fight scope of practice reform at the 
state level.213  But even if physician groups win some of these battles, 
the specter of diminished economic prospects could drive away new 
medical school candidates who consider such an investment to be too 
risky.  This risk of low physician supply during greatly increasing 
demand on the system means that we would have to place a lot of 
faith on mobile health technologies that might be good enough to 
disrupt the medical field, but not good enough to deliver adequate 
care.  In the latter case, our nation’s healthcare security will be 
threatened.               
To solve this issue, I propose a “grand bargain” between 
physicians groups and other medical providers. Instead of allowing 
themselves to be pitted against each other to set up a deregulatory 
medical practice scheme that ultimately might only benefit a select 
few technology companies and their investors, I suggest that these 
warring professional factions best strategy is to work together against 
a greater threat to their professional livelihood.  The first part of this 
bargain would be for physician groups like the AMA and their state 
counterparts (e.g., the California Medical Association) to negotiate 
expanded scope of practice provisions for physician extenders, 
including those dependent on mobile health technologies to augment 
their professional capabilities.214    Second, to encourage an adequate 
supply of medical professionals, a mobile health excise tax on each 
transaction that use such technology would go to establish a medical 
education fund to help lower the risk of entering the medical 
profession and to defray educational debt payments that exceed a 
 
212. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’r v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) 
(slip op.). 
213. See INST. OF MED., supra note 115, at 112-14. 
214. Daniel Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some 
Competitive Issues Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally While 
Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. POL’Y 87, 115 (2011) (“As 
noted in the 1997 Telemedicine Report to Congress, there appears to be 
adequate legal authority for the federal government to establish uniform 
physician licensing and preempt state licensing regimes.”)   
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certain threshold of one’s income.  And third, a safe-harbor period of 
at least 15-20 years to require that under federal law (to be 
administered by the FDA) medical diagnoses and treatment must be 
made by an actual human medical provider, not just a mobile device 
or software application.  Obviously, both an excise tax on mobile 
health transactions to fund medical education and a safe-harbor 
period restricting providerless care (even if technologically feasible) 
would be aggressively challenged by the mobile health industry and 
perhaps others who might see this as unwarranted economic 
protection for medical professionals.  That is a fair critique, but one 
that should be balanced against the loss of not only many middle and 
upper middle class jobs, but the attendant healthcare security of our 
nation as it will enter one of the most challenging periods in its 
history—the graying of America.    
VI. Conclusion 
As Paul Starr recounts in his seminal work, “The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine,” it was not until the latter 
half of the 19th century to the early 20th century that we saw such 
developments as the rise of standardized scientific techniques, 
professional training for doctors and nurses, antiseptic protocols, 
radiology, laboratory testing, and the modern hospital as a place for 
curing disease rather than segregating the hopelessly ill and 
impoverished.215 Mobile health technology fits into that narrative, not 
only as a scientific transformation, but also a transformation in how 
medical professionals will relate to one another, to patients, and to 
society.    
We have a serious primary care shortage problem that might only 
be solvable by relaxing restrictive state licensing and scope of practice 
laws in conjunction with enabling disruptive innovations like mobile 
health technology.  However, in making laws to address mobile health 
technology, we need to consider the political economy implications of 
“providerless” medicine and whether our healthcare security will 
remain intact if providers are driven out of medicine by this prospect.  
Thus, I propose in this article that often hostile physician and 
physician extender groups enter into a détente, to negotiate less 
restrictive licensing and scope of practice regimes that can better deal 
with healthcare cost and access problems.  Connected to this measure, 
I also propose an excise tax on mobile health transactions in order to 
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fund medical education for the next generation of healthcare providers 
and a 15-20 year restriction period for “providerless” medicine 
delivered by technology corporations.  As a society, we need to assert 
our values in the face of transformative technologies that can 
dramatically alter our lives for better or for worse, and not simply 
accept the inevitability of being pawns in such transformations.     
 
